0:00 Welcome to the Messy City Podcast, where we talk with the people who design, plan, build, develop, or even just think about how to create beautiful, successful, and humane cities and towns. 0:13 Let's learn from each other and create places we truly care about. 0:44 Welcome back to the Messy City Podcast. 0:46 This is Kevin Klinkenberg. 0:48 Delighted to have Chuck Marone in the studio today. 0:50 He's actually in town in Kansas City giving a presentation tonight. 0:56 And we're able to twist his arm to come by and chat for a little bit. 0:58 No, you didn't have to twist. 1:00 I was delighted. 1:01 I was hoping that we could fit this in. 1:03 Yeah. 1:03 Because, dude, I listen to your podcast all the time. 1:05 Well, and likewise. 1:06 And I have actually been... 1:10 catching up the last few days on a lot of your more recent ones this year, 1:15 which actually have been a remarkable collection of podcasts. 1:19 Really? 1:19 I mean, they've been great. 1:20 Oh, that means a lot. 1:22 And a lot of speakers and topics I wasn't familiar with. 1:25 And so that was really cool. 1:27 So anyway, we're going to talk today. 1:30 And this is probably going to be a very different kind of conversation for an 1:34 architect and an engineer to have. 1:35 Yeah, an architect and an engineer walk into a 1:38 Yeah. 1:39 A recording studio. 1:40 Exactly. 1:41 I've got, Chuck, I've got a couple of pages of notes of things, which I almost never do. 1:47 And we may not get to any of these, 1:49 but I'm going to at least have the intention of working through a couple of topics. 1:53 Okay. 1:54 We'll see. 1:54 We'll see how we go. 1:55 But I think, you know, the main sort of overall main thing I really wanted to talk with you in more depth about is the financial side of the housing conversation. 2:07 Yeah. 2:08 And so my baseline is that I'm an architect. 2:14 And architects, as you know, don't know very much about money. 2:16 Yeah. 2:18 Yeah. 2:20 You know, you can, 2:21 I went through six years of architecture school and there wasn't a single course 2:25 required in business or finance. 2:28 Sure. 2:28 Not even accounting. 2:29 If you can imagine, we didn't even have to learn basic accounting. 2:32 We had to do engineering economics to get my civil engineering degree. 2:36 You had a, you know, basically like, here's how you do net present value and all that kind of like, You know, a dollar 10 years from now is worth how much today? 2:44 Like all that kind of stuff. 2:46 So it was really, really helpful. 2:48 But yeah, you architects had like more important things to do. 2:51 Yeah, 2:51 we had five years of design studio that we had to go through and all the hazing 2:56 that comes with that. 2:58 But I'm a relatively smart guy, and I think I have learned a lot on this topic over the years. 3:06 And I have really learned a lot from your conversations and discussions on the issue. 3:12 There's a lot about the way you are looking at the housing problem. 3:16 are things that i never really thought about before but now i've really come to understand them better and i think they're they're really important i think that's astounding to me because you are a smart guy and you are like neck deep in this i 3:28 do think one of my frustrations has been the housing conversation is dominated by 3:32 people who dismiss The financial side of it and the financial side is like 80% of it. 3:38 Yeah. 3:39 And I think as I have come to understand it, I would tend to agree with that. 3:43 I would have five years ago, I would have said this is all about the regulatory side. 3:47 Yeah. 3:48 And I do think the regulatory side is really important and it's a problem. 3:51 Mm-hmm. 3:52 But the financial side, 3:54 it's so much more interesting to me to think about the impact of it on everything 4:01 that we're talking about related to housing. 4:02 So where I want to start is, so there's been a lot. 4:07 I have been re-listening to some of your podcasts where you trace some of the work 4:11 in your book, The Housing Trap. 4:13 Sure. 4:13 Sure. 4:14 Uh, and, uh, the growth over time, starting with the, um, the 30 year mortgage, 4:20 and then all the subsequent policies over many years that built upon it and made 4:24 financing easier and easier, et cetera. 4:26 Uh, and, and I think I've had a couple of epiphanies along the way. 4:30 I guess where I started was a couple of years ago when anybody would say the word 4:34 financialization, I would, there's a part of me that would just roll my eyes because I'm like, what the hell is this big word? 4:40 It is like a cop-out for everybody, right? 4:42 It's like, oh, financialization. 4:44 It's like corporate greed. 4:46 It's whatever your boogeyman, financialization is one of them. 4:49 Yeah. 4:50 And so it was really hard for me to grasp. 4:52 Um, but I think I've really begun to start to grasp it. 4:56 And a lot of that is through, um, through your work, which has been really, really helpful. 4:59 Uh, there was also a chart I saw, uh, recently, uh, where it looked at, and this may get controversial for some people, 5:08 but it looked at say the last 50 years of home prices priced in dollars versus 5:13 priced in gold. 5:14 Yeah. 5:15 And if you look at it priced in dollars, obviously it's been a hockey stick. 5:18 Priced in gold has basically been a flat line since the 1970s. 5:23 So to me, that's an aspect of the conversation. 5:26 Now you are starting to sound crazy to a lot of people. 5:29 I know. 5:29 Exactly. 5:30 I know. 5:31 Yes. 5:33 But the thing I think that I wanted to get back to was, you know, when I think over the long course of the, let's say the last 100 years and the evolution of housing finance, I, I tend to think that when you put policies in place, especially big policies, 5:50 it often takes 20 to 30 years, maybe a generation or two to really know what the impact of that is. 5:56 And a lot of what we started with started, or what we talk about started in the great depression. 6:03 Um, But we had two really aberrant periods there. 6:06 We had the Depression and the war. 6:08 And then we had the aberrant period after the war for a generation where we had 6:12 like no competition in the world. 6:14 And then reality started to hit in the 1970s. 6:18 And then if you fast forward, 6:20 when you really start to see the Case-Shiller Housing Index separate and really go 6:25 hockey stick was about the late 90s. 6:28 And to me, that kind of fits the profile. 6:30 It's about 30 years or so after you could really feel the impacts of those policies. 6:35 And so I wonder what you how you'd react to that. 6:37 Yeah, no, I feel like what you do when you when you centralize and then make this massive shift, which is what the 30-year mortgage is. 6:47 It's an unnatural product that we released onto the financial marketplace. 6:54 What you have is you have, in a sense, a generation before you get mortgage-backed securities. 6:59 You have another generation before they kind of start to subsume themselves or they 7:04 get out of the kind of the lab, like the safe space, right? 7:09 Because originally mortgage-backed securities were just the highest rated loans. 7:16 We did a redlining map here in Kansas City years ago, 7:19 and I did a big thing about reparations in Kansas City and looked at redlining. 7:23 You know, we are conditioned right now to think redlining is a horrible thing. 7:28 And I understand that in our modern context. 7:31 But if you go back in the Great Depression, when these maps first came out, they were saying the federal government is going to back this new risky, never before been done long-term product in the marketplace. 7:45 This thing that like no bank would ever issue because it's really financially an 7:50 insane product, a 30 year mortgage. 7:53 The federal government is going to back these. 7:55 And if we're going to back them, 7:57 they have to be in the best neighborhoods and the most secure properties with the 8:01 most, you know, so there was like a financial logic to it. 8:05 I think you can flip it around and be like, yeah, we, we pumped a bunch of capital into the 8:09 white affluent neighborhoods and denied the other neighborhoods capital. 8:14 But it wasn't just people in Washington, D.C. 8:17 saying, you know, let's let's screw immigrants and poor people and minorities. 8:22 It was like, here's this financial innovation. 8:26 You get a generation out and now that mooring is gone and you start to securitize it. 8:32 But you're still securitizing the best of the best. 8:35 So if you buy the security, 8:36 you're basically just getting a diversified portfolio of like the best mortgages. 8:41 You know, if that works so well, then what if we just, you know, expanded that a little bit here and there. 8:47 And when things start to get tough and you get this like third generation of it, 8:51 you wind up with the subprime mortgage-backed security, 8:53 you wind up with this whole like derivation of products based off of this. 8:58 Because by the time you and I are buying houses, This concept has been normalized over two generations now. 9:07 So it doesn't seem scary. 9:09 It doesn't seem risky. 9:10 It doesn't seem insane the way it would have. 9:14 Someone buying a house in the Great Depression was going to finance at a local bank 9:18 with a 50% down payment. 9:20 They were going to finance it with a three-year, four-year, five-year balloon payment at the end. 9:24 They were going to pay interest only on that loan. 9:27 Mm-hmm. 9:28 All of a sudden now you've got a 30-year mortgage that I can amortize this whole 9:33 thing over 30 years. 9:35 That would have been like an insane idea. 9:37 Yeah. 9:38 And what's funny – or I don't know what's funny. 9:40 Yeah, yeah. 9:41 But an aspect of that that's interesting is if you go back and look at the homeownership data – 9:47 Even with those much harsher terms pre 30 year mortgage, about half of all households owned their home. 9:55 And then we took it up with the with the mortgage finance to about two thirds. 10:00 But there was still, you know, about half the people that with that approach owned a home. 10:07 owned a home, not only that, but housing was like broadly affordable. 10:12 Right. 10:12 Right. 10:13 I mean, you, 10:13 you actually had housing prices and construction techniques and approaches and, 10:17 and, you know, localized markets that actually produced housing for people to get into. 10:23 There was no, um, well, I wrote in the book, you know, free great depression, great depression era housing, you know, before world war two housing was abundant, cheap and kind of junky, kind of crappy. 10:35 Right. 10:36 After World War II, housing has become progressively less, less, more expensive, less attainable, more rare in a sense, and then, you know, higher quality. 10:49 Yeah. 10:50 A higher base quality. 10:51 Yeah. 10:52 You know, the high quality is less than what it used to be. 10:55 Absolutely. 10:56 Right. 10:56 But we've got a bigger middle. 10:58 Yeah. 10:58 Yeah. 10:59 The average typical house that you might build today is built so much more soundly 11:04 than any house from 100 years ago, even though the materials are worse. 11:08 Yes. 11:08 Yes. 11:09 Absolutely. 11:10 Can we talk about the 30-year mortgage? 11:12 Yeah, please. 11:12 I find that this is like a weird... It's so normal for us, right? 11:16 Like everybody... 11:19 there was a thought exercise that I heard someone do recently on a financial podcast. 11:24 And he asked, uh, the, the host of the show, he's like, if you were going to lend someone money for 30 years, 11:33 or you were going to go buy a 30-year treasury from the federal government, 11:38 and you were going to hold that for 30 years. 11:40 You're not going to hedge it. 11:41 You're not going to do anything weird. 11:42 You're not going to try to sell it in two years. 11:45 You're going to hold it for 30 years, and you're just going to collect annual interest payments on that, and then at the end, you get your note back. 11:51 What interest rate would you require to do that? 11:55 And the answer is because you're saying, I don't know what inflation is going to be. 11:59 I don't know what future interest rates are going to be. 12:01 I don't know any of this stuff. 12:02 You would demand a really, really high coupon rate, something 10%, 11%, 12%. 12:08 I'm giving you money for three decades. 12:10 I don't get it back. 12:11 I can't come and get it back. 12:12 I just get the payments. 12:13 Right. 12:14 That interest rate has been, you know, for the last 30 years, 4.5%, 5%. 12:20 It's now up to like 7%. 12:22 It is artificially low in a way that doesn't reflect the market. 12:30 The reason why this is an unnatural product and the reason why the 30-year mortgage 12:35 has wreaked such havoc on our financial system is because when you have volatility, which you're going to have, there's no escape mechanism from that note. 12:48 There's a joke in the banking sector that the banking model is the 363 model. 12:55 You borrow money at 3%, you lend it out at 6%, and then you go to the golf course at 3 p.m. 13:01 That's your business model. 13:02 It's very, very simple. 13:03 So you make money off that spread between 3% and 6%. 13:06 That's the money you make. 13:07 And if you make good quality loans that pay 6%, you can borrow money at 3%. 13:14 And you can make a good living. 13:16 Well, if you're a bank, the money you're borrowing is short-term money. 13:21 I'm borrowing from you. 13:22 You're a depositor. 13:23 You can come and get your deposit anytime you want. 13:25 I'm borrowing from businesses and from whoever deposits money in my bank. 13:30 That's a short-term loan. 13:32 When I make a long-term loan at 6%, what I am betting on is that the market doesn't change, okay? 13:40 If all of a sudden interest rates went to 7%, I, as a bank, have two choices. 13:45 I can either pay my depositors 7%, in which case they'll stick around because that's the market rate. 13:51 But I will lose now because I've got my loan out at 6%. 13:54 I will lose money every month. 13:57 I will slowly bleed to death. 13:59 Or I can keep my interest rates low, in which case I'll make money, but all my depositors will leave and my bank will go bankrupt. 14:07 This is why you don't see any local bank doing a long-term loan. 14:11 All the loans were short-term. 14:13 And the reason was, is if the market shifted and changed, the bank might have to bleed for a little while, but within three to five years, 14:21 they could roll over their entire portfolio and reset at whatever a new thing was. 14:28 When you come in and say 30-year mortgage, what you're saying is, 14:32 You have to have a sense of what's going to happen two decades, three decades from now. 14:37 Point to three decades in time where we haven't had volatile interest rates, 14:42 volatile inflation, you know, all of this kind of stuff. 14:46 All of that wrecks us. 14:49 someone holding a 30-year mortgage. 14:51 And so what you see is that in the 60s, when we have high inflation, the federal government has to come in and rescue banks. 14:57 In the 70s, when we have high inflation, the federal government has to come in and rescue banks. 15:01 In the 80s, 15:02 when we were trying to juice the economy and get out of the problems we had created 15:05 for ourselves in the 60s and 70s, we get an SNL crisis because we deregulated. 15:10 Then we get, you know, this is now my time, the Clinton administration, and, you know, we need to... 15:17 you know, decentralized things, you wind up in, you know, Clinton and then, you know, hyper during the Bush administration, you get the subprime crisis and then you get, you know, 15:28 the recovery bubble that we've had since then where we've been trying to juice it. 15:32 All of this is a reaction to this unnatural product, a product that financially makes no sense in the marketplace. 15:41 Here's the crazy part. 15:43 The Trump administration right now, You know, and we could talk about Harris's plan for housing, which was no better than the Trump's plan, but it's different in substantive ways. 15:52 The Trump administration won. 15:54 They're now in power. 15:56 They want to reprivatize Fannie and Freddie so that they can do 40 year and 50 year mortgages. 16:02 Yeah. 16:02 So even like crazier loans. 16:05 Yeah. 16:06 And I think what you, 16:07 what you detailed so well in the book was all of the incremental steps that happen 16:12 with each successive crisis that expanded that. 16:15 So even like the original mortgages that were set up through the homeowners loan 16:20 corporation were like 20 year mortgages. 16:21 They were 20 year. 16:22 Yeah. 16:23 And then we get, 16:24 we get into trouble and it's like, well, 16:25 let's create Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae and then let's make these 30 years. 16:28 Yeah. 16:28 Yeah. 16:30 That's right. 16:30 And then we'll expand the pool of people who can apply. 16:33 Yeah, yeah. 16:34 And then, you know, we didn't have, you know, when you have a 50% down payment, 16:38 you don't need mortgage insurance because you've got lots of equity in your house. 16:42 You're not going to walk away from all that equity. 16:44 It gives the bank a big cushion. 16:46 But when we go to 40% down payment, 30% down payment, 20%, 10%, the federal government steps in and is like, well, we'll ensure that. 16:55 We'll provide insurance on that. 16:58 Now you start to get people with no down payment at all or nominal down payment. 17:03 They don't have any equity. 17:05 So if your house drops 5% in value, you're underwater. 17:09 And so the case that I would make for why this is a bigger deal than we realize is, 17:15 you know, 17:16 why is it that we have such housing price affordability issues across the entire 17:21 country in every market? 17:23 And what is it that we all share? 17:24 Because demand is very localized and very different from place to place. 17:30 But what is consistent is that everything is financed basically the same way across 17:35 the whole country. 17:36 That's exactly right. 17:38 And, and not only across the whole country, but increasingly, I mean, across the entire Western financial world. 17:46 Right. 17:47 So like I'm in New Zealand, they're dealing with the same issue. 17:49 Um, even though they have a, you know, a different financing system, they require a higher down payment and they have a shorter, uh, They have a shorter rollover period. 18:00 They don't use a 30-year mortgage, but they're having the same financial impacts because they have the same securitized market, the same liquidity issues up and down. 18:10 Yeah. 18:10 Interesting. 18:11 Yeah. 18:12 How familiar are you with the notion of yield curve control? 18:17 Yeah. 18:17 You know a little bit about that? 18:18 Sure, yeah. 18:20 I ask just because I've just recently kind of learned about it. 18:22 Yeah. 18:23 You want to talk about it? 18:24 Well, you know, mortgages, 30-year mortgages, are basically pinned to the 10-year treasury bond. 18:33 And the reason that is is because, again, when you're a bank, you're arbitraging a short-term lending with a long-term... 18:43 short-term borrowing with long-term lending, right? 18:46 So I am going to go buy a 10 year treasury at 4% and then I will write my mortgage 18:53 at 6% for 30 years. 18:55 And what I'm hoping is that most of those mortgages are paid off before we get to 19:00 the 10 year line. 19:01 So my risk goes down. 19:02 Um, but when I get beyond that, that the market is relatively stable so that, you know, I'm, I'm making money off that spread. 19:10 Um, 19:12 The yield curve control is really this notion that the Federal Reserve will step in and buy up. 19:23 I mean, when you hear the Federal Reserve is lowering interest rates, 19:26 what they're generally doing is saying that's the overnight rate we're going to 19:29 charge. 19:29 So we're going to charge other banks to move money around and lend money. 19:34 When we lend money out, they put reserves with us. 19:36 It's going to be at that rate. 19:38 But then the Federal Reserve will go out and buy short-term treasuries. 19:42 The treasury does an auction. 19:45 We're running a $2 trillion debt this year, so there's a lot of debt that the federal government issues. 19:50 When debt matures, they have to reissue it and roll it over. 19:53 So the federal government will go out and say, we're gonna do a $500 billion debt offering. 19:59 If the Federal Reserve steps in and buys that, basically like creates the market for it, they will drive down the interest rate in the short term. 20:07 They will have yield curve control. 20:08 We're gonna buy enough to keep that rate at one and a half percent or 2%. 20:13 And if the rate starts to go up, the Federal Reserve will step in and buy it And that supply and demand, that demand for that will drive the interest rate down. 20:23 What you see, and maybe this is where you're going, you look at countries like Greece after the 2008 crisis. 20:32 Greece, Ireland, Italy lost control of their yield curve. 20:38 Right. 20:40 They did that because, in a sense, there was no central bank buying that down. 20:49 The ECB wasn't at that point buying it down. 20:52 And so what happened is the market said, if we're going to lend to Greece, it's going to be at 18%, even if it's like a 30-day note or a 60-day note, because they feel like they're going to collapse. 21:01 Right. 21:02 In the US, that can happen. 21:03 Yeah. 21:04 Because the Federal Reserve can just buy, in a sense, 21:06 like unlimited amount of government debt and bring that interest rate down to 21:10 whatever we want it to be. 21:12 Yeah, so I'm not trying to trap you or anything. 21:15 No, no, no. 21:16 The topic is interesting for me. 21:18 It's become interesting in a couple ways because I've just become a little more 21:22 educated in it the last several months. 21:25 And it's specifically because, I guess maybe by way of background, 21:32 I've always been the kind of person that I tend to have an allergy to whatever the 21:36 mainstream establishment view is of whatever is going on. 21:39 That's why you and I get along. 21:40 We're natural skeptics. 21:42 Yes. 21:43 And I'm not always saying, not saying this is always a good way to be, but it's, that's how I am. 21:48 And certainly I think most of us who came up in the professions with the new 21:52 urbanism really had that kind of. 21:55 Well, we, we have a, let me, let me say it this way. 21:58 Yeah. 21:59 We have seen in our profession, civil engineering, architecture, which are august, respected professions, that in many ways the emperor has no clothes. 22:09 So it's not hard to look over to another domain, economists, whatever it is, and be like, they're the same humans we are. 22:18 Does the emperor have no clothes there? 22:20 It's a level of skepticism the normal person doesn't have. 22:23 Yeah, 22:23 and we could probably do a whole podcast on why this is the case and why we think 22:28 establishment opinion is often wrong. 22:30 So there are a couple of economists that I've gravitated to that I listen to and 22:34 that I think are really smart and interesting. 22:37 And they've been talking about yield curve control for a little while, basically saying they think this is coming. 22:41 This is what's coming. 22:43 that it's the only solution to the dilemma that the Fed and the Treasury face right now. 22:48 And so let me talk about that. 22:50 Their historical analogy that they use is the post-war period. 22:55 From 1942 to 1951, 22:56 the Fed had yield curve control where they set the floor and then they set the top. 23:03 So they bought Treasury bonds to set the peak. 23:06 And they did that in order to keep 23:09 Mortgage is very low for that period of time so that returning veterans could get 23:14 really, 23:14 really cheap mortgages and build houses and do all the things that you talked 23:18 about. 23:19 That's exactly what they did. 23:20 Yeah. 23:21 And so the thought process is that is that is where the Trump administration would 23:27 like to go and why they are hectoring the Fed. 23:30 and trying to push them so hard because they would like to institute yield curve control. 23:35 And then also the thing that happened in that period is we had a similarly high 23:39 debt to GDP as we do now. 23:41 And there are two consequences that I understand of yield curve control. 23:46 One is it does help housing, 23:48 helps make buying houses more affordable at the entry level because it brings 23:54 mortgage prices down. 23:55 The other thing it does is it will cause inflation. 23:58 And so you'll inflate away the debt. 24:00 Ultimately. 24:01 Yeah. 24:01 Let me let's make the I feel like what's going on right now with the Trump 24:07 administration and the Fed. 24:09 I feel like we should make the best case for it because I think that there is a, 24:14 there's a housing aspect to this and like Trump is a real estate guy. 24:17 So like, I think he gets like low interest rates are good for people building and financing. 24:22 But you also, you know, I feel like with the tariff policy, the idea is we want to manufacture locally where you can't build, 24:30 billion dollar plants and equipment investments with higher interest rates. 24:34 You've got to have low interest rates to do that. 24:36 So I think there's an economic argument that if we're going to drive up prices on 24:40 imports and we want to domesticate manufacturing, that we need low interest rates to do that. 24:46 I would argue that, yeah, 24:48 we probably should have done that the last two decades because we're now in a 24:52 period of time where we're not going to have low interest rates. 24:55 We're either going to have high rates of inflation or Or we're going to have high interest rates. 25:02 It can't be, in a sense, we can't have low interest rates and low inflation right now. 25:08 We just have too much debt. 25:09 We have too many obligations. 25:10 We have too many promises. 25:12 And it doesn't matter if we're going to raise tariffs and want local manufacturing. 25:18 there's not enough slack in the system to do it. 25:20 Yeah. 25:20 And, and I'm not here to say that's the, whatever they do is the right thing to do or the wrong thing to do. 25:26 But as I look at the landscape, 25:28 I think that is the best case of what they would like to do because they would like 25:33 to really jumpstart the housing market, 25:35 which is relevant to the conversation we're having about housing and housing 25:38 finance, because then once again, 25:41 it's another intervention in upon many other interventions in the housing market. 25:46 But listen to what you just said. 25:47 You kickstart the housing market. 25:50 The housing market is at all-time highs. 25:52 I think you probably subliminally mean kickstart the housing construction side of it. 26:00 Correct. 26:00 Right? 26:00 Like stimulate that side. 26:02 But I mean, if you believe... 26:04 if you are an adherent to the idea that housing prices are set by supply and demand 26:10 of people who want to buy houses and people who want to build houses, 26:13 then we should just be building unlimited number of houses because there's a, 26:18 there's a huge demand for it. 26:19 Yeah. 26:20 Right. 26:20 Like that's why prices are high. 26:22 Yeah. 26:23 I think it's way more complex than that. 26:25 Yeah, sure. 26:25 But you know, to me, the, the, the idea that making 40 year mortgages is, would create more housing. 26:36 Creating 40-year mortgages would just make existing housing more expensive. 26:40 Yeah. 26:40 And, you know, I think what's fascinating is, you know, relevant to one of your more recent podcasts I listened to. 26:47 Some of these things are going to happen or not happen of their own accord. 26:50 They're not controllable by you and me. 26:53 They may work in the short term, may not work in the short term. 26:56 We'll see. 26:58 But the point is really that they're part of a big complex system that we may not 27:04 really be able to impact. 27:05 And, and, really for those of us working in a more localized place, the question is, how do we, you know, how do we focus locally and do what we can in that environment? 27:14 Yeah. 27:14 There's this interesting discussion about China today because China sits as either the boogeyman that's going to take us over or like the empire that's collapsing, 27:26 depending on your perspective on it. 27:29 I feel like the interesting argument about China is that For a long time, the Tom Friedmans of the world would marvel at China. 27:37 I think Tom Friedman actually wrote once, Minnesotan, if we could just be China for a day, we could accomplish all these things. 27:46 Authoritarianism has some advantages. 27:50 There's something to be said about just being able to make a decision and go out and do it. 27:55 But the longterm, you have things like the rule of law, you have contracts, 28:00 you have a free market that sets interest rates based on supply and demand. 28:05 You have these things because the checks that it makes on you are healthy for a 28:10 system to grow strong. 28:13 If you can just break any contract you want when you need to, well, contracts don't mean anything. 28:19 And then all of a sudden, 28:20 like no one's making contracts and no one's starting businesses and doing stuff. 28:24 if you can just print as much money as you want and there's no consequence to that, 28:27 or there's no, in a sense, like market feedback, that's going to punish you for that. 28:33 You know, you will go a long, long, long way before your system then collapses and fails. 28:39 We're supposed to have painful feedback because painful feedback stops us from 28:43 doing stupid stuff. 28:45 I feel like in my adult life and your adult life, 28:49 Our economic policy in particular has been about countermanding painful feedback in 28:56 the name of growth, in the name of compassion. 29:00 You know, like this was a this was a bipartisan agreed on thing. 29:03 Right. 29:05 But it has left us like really, really fragile at kind of all aspects of of our social life. 29:12 Yeah. 29:13 Yeah. 29:14 I think that's true. 29:14 I think there's a lot of politics involved with that. 29:16 It's nobody wants to be the one in office that institutes something that could or 29:21 doesn't institute something that we're paying ensues. 29:24 Yeah. 29:25 But I mean, you right now have a federal government. 29:27 I mean, if we just go there. 29:29 you know, the Republicans, you know, we're going to have a shutdown here. 29:33 It sounds like in the next couple of days, you know, the Republican bill would add $2 trillion to the debt. 29:39 The Democrat bill would add $3 trillion to the debt. 29:42 Historically speaking, they would compromise at 2.2 or 2.4. 29:46 Both of those numbers are asinine. 29:48 They're just crazy. 29:49 They're insane. 29:50 If your goal is to have like a stable functioning economy with a good feedback loop, 29:55 Those are crazy numbers. 29:56 Yeah. 29:57 And I don't care if your policy result is like, 29:59 we're going to raise taxes to close that gap or we're going to cut spending to 30:01 close that gap. 30:02 Like you, you can't just pretend that that's okay. 30:06 Right. 30:07 Right. 30:08 Um, 30:09 I want to hit on a couple other issues that touch on housing and some of these, 30:13 I know you've talked about before, but I think they're worth talking about again. 30:17 Yeah. 30:18 seems to me like one of the, one of the things that we don't talk so much about is like, if, if you think, if you think we have a national market for housing, which we do and we don't, um, at a national level, you could definitely make an argument. 30:31 We've got plenty of supply. 30:32 We have, we have ample housing. 30:34 Uh, and if I look at like my city and my region, we have ample housing in our city. 30:40 What we lack is we lack housing in the most desirable places where people want to be 30:46 But we have an abundance of housing, so to speak, 30:52 in places that there generally is very low demand where people don't want to be. 30:56 And some of this is the old Jim Kunstler line of, you know, we don't have enough places that people really care about. 31:04 And so... 31:05 people move out of them, they throw them away and they don't really want to invest. 31:08 And, and some of it are just other issues that impact housing that make them undesirable, like high crime, 31:14 maybe schools that people don't want school districts that people don't want to 31:16 live in, et cetera. 31:18 So it's kind of a fascinating thing because like in my city, 31:21 We have far more geographic area that has housing that's generally in decline than we have really desirable areas where there's a shortage and prices are pushing up. 31:34 And it seems like that's common in most cities, not all, but most. 31:38 So you know where I live. 31:40 I live in Brainerd. 31:41 It's a couple hours north of Minneapolis. 31:42 Yeah. 31:44 I live in a house that was built in 1914. 31:47 It was at some point a mansion-esque kind of place for somebody. 31:53 It's, I think, total living space, something like over 3,000 square feet, four bedrooms, two bathrooms, really beautiful place. 32:02 I've got a nice yard out back. 32:05 My monthly mortgage payment, this is not insurance and taxes, but just the mortgage payment is $750 a month. 32:14 You couldn't move to Brainerd today and get that deal. 32:18 You had to have made that a couple decades ago. 32:20 But you could move there today and get one for double that. 32:24 You could move into a beautiful home in a really nice neighborhood for $1,500 a 32:30 month, own that thing, and in 20 years from now, you'd have tons of equity and you'd be sitting really well. 32:37 Even people who work remote are like, I don't want to live in Brainerd. 32:40 Yeah. 32:41 And so I feel like your, I feel like your point that, I mean, there was a study done in the university of Kansas, I think, um, that said like in all but four markets in the country, there is an excess housing supply. 32:55 Um, 32:57 I think your insight in that it's in neighborhoods that we've walked away from. 33:02 It's in places that we're not caring for. 33:05 We can see that here in Kansas City in spades that you have lots of places that 33:10 actually the bones of the neighborhood are really, these are streetcar suburbs in a lot of ways. 33:15 They were great neighborhoods and we've walked away from them. 33:18 And so, you know, a family, let me, let me, I'm doing air quotes, 33:22 an affluent family or a family that wants to send their kid to a nice school or 33:27 dah, dah, dah. 33:28 Their thing is not, I can't buy a house in Kansas city. 33:33 It's, 33:33 I can't buy a house in the neighborhood with the nice school in the place that I 33:37 want to be. 33:39 You take that out to San Francisco now or New York city. 33:42 And you're like, I, you know, I want to live in San Francisco. 33:44 I want to live in this neighborhood and we haven't built any new housing there in 30 years. 33:49 Good luck. 33:50 That's where a lot of our, 33:54 I think our cultural discourse around housing comes from and gets really distorted 34:00 because the reality on the ground is what you and I have experienced, which is, You know, we know a lot of people who are rolling up their sleeves, 34:06 going to these neighborhoods and trying to revive them and bring them back and make 34:10 them good places to live again. 34:12 yeah i mean so i wrote a piece several years ago that tried to where i was trying to make the point i reread it not long ago and thought that i didn't i did not adequately like express it but the idea was like the solution to new york city's 34:25 housing price housing price problem is actually to make all these other places more desirable to live in yes i mean if yes and it feels like as part of the culture of whatever we are whether you call yourself an urbanist or a yimby or whatever else 34:40 That we would be so much better off by exerting more energy in really working on 34:46 the places that have low demand today, but they actually have really good housing stock. 34:51 They're just maybe, you know, they're not the places where the affluent people want to live. 34:56 If we could lift those places up, urban, rural, suburban, whatever they are, that that is, you know, that those are buildings and places that already exist. 35:05 Yeah. 35:06 The lift is so much less, right? 35:08 This has been my frustration with, well, 35:10 we need to have a president who changes all housing laws for the whole country, 35:14 or we need to go to the state capitol and get everything changed. 35:17 The low lift that is needed to make the struggling neighborhoods of Kansas City 35:21 nicer, the struggling neighborhoods of Brainerd nicer, it's such a low lift, and it would benefit so many people to do it. 35:28 It's frustrating to me that that's not the center of our policy agenda. 35:34 I'm... 35:36 it's funny because, you know, I, I, I recognize that there's a certain love of living in New York. 35:44 Our good friend, Mike Lydon is like, I would never live anywhere else, you know? 35:47 And I, I admire him for it. 35:49 He's got two boys or three boys living in a apartment in Brooklyn. 35:52 Um, You know, when I talk to people who live in New York and I say, you know, what is it about New York? 36:00 Oh, I love the museum and I love going to the Yankees games and I love Broadway and da-da-da-da. 36:07 Okay, I'm like, all right. 36:09 I live in Brainerd. 36:10 How often do you go to the museum in New York? 36:14 Because I probably get there like once a year, you know? 36:17 How often do you go to a ball game? 36:19 Because I go to a game at Target Field like four or five times a year. 36:24 you know, you like Broadway. 36:26 Like I saw Hamilton in downtown Minneapolis. 36:28 Like we have culture too. 36:30 Yeah. 36:32 You know, to me, you can get a reason, 36:36 We joke in my hometown because we're this like two hours north of Minneapolis, 36:41 this kind of tourist area. 36:44 You know, there's lakes and trails and all this stuff. 36:46 And people drive up from Minneapolis on the weekends to enjoy the Brainerd Lakes area. 36:50 You ask people in my neighborhood, how often do you get out on a lake? 36:53 How often do you go? 36:54 They never do it. 36:56 Just like people in New York City don't do the New York City things that you go to 37:00 New York City to do. 37:02 I do think that if you made Kansas City... 37:07 Let me say this in a non-flattering way. 37:11 If you made it a more comparable, lesser version of what people like about New York City, 37:18 To me, that would not be hard to do. 37:20 And it would have tremendous payoffs, both for Kansas City and for New York City. 37:24 Right. 37:25 And if you did that in Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, Denver, like go around. 37:34 I think that the whole thing about, you know, we need everybody in the country to move to D.C., New York City and San Francisco would would would melt away. 37:43 Yeah. 37:43 There's a story reminds me of when, when we lived in Savannah, my wife and I would joke, Oh, it's so, it's so nice to like live near the, near, near the beach and, you know, with Tybee Island just down the road. 37:54 And then we'd say, well, when's the last time we went to the beach? 37:57 You know? 37:58 Oh, I guess it was like six months ago. 37:59 Yeah. 38:00 We, we bought a boat during the pandemic, which seemed like the most crazy excessive thing. 38:06 I've lived in Minnesota all my life, never had a boat. 38:08 Yeah. 38:09 Um, my wife and I, I mean, it was one of those like luxury things we just could never afford. 38:14 And during the pandemic, we bought a really cheap boat, 38:18 but it was something that would get out on the water and then you could jump in the 38:20 lake and like enjoy it. 38:22 And that's, you know, we've been doing that the last few years. 38:25 Um, But I'm talking like $4,000. 38:26 There are bicycles that cost more than the boat we bought. 38:34 But yeah, we lived our whole life without getting out on the lake, even though that is like the experience, 38:40 the quintessential Minnesota experience is going out on a lake on a hot day in the 38:44 summer. 38:44 Yeah. 38:45 Yeah. 38:46 So, you know, if I were to circle back on that, I would just say... 38:50 Over the last few years, largely because of the job I have, 38:52 I've had a lot of people ask me why I get so fixated on issues like crime and 38:59 schools and other things that people might consider social issues. 39:03 And I think a lot of that just comes from... 39:07 My concern and understanding that like we've got these great assets already, 39:11 these wonderful neighborhoods. 39:13 What are the things that are preventing young people, middle class people, 39:18 whomever from buying in those neighborhoods and really lifting those places up? 39:25 Uh, and because to me, this is the crux of like, this is the low hanging fruit of, of, of how we can really begin to get to this issue. 39:34 You're reminding me of some new urbanist conversations I've had. 39:38 Cause there's a, there's a strain of, uh, you know, urbanist thought that is like, I like my city's dirty and I like them gritty. 39:49 And I like when I get up and there's, you know, homeless people on the street, cause it tells me it's real. 39:54 And I always thought, you know, okay, I'm not going to begrudge you if that's what your version of a city is. 40:01 But I will tell you that I could never talk my dad into living in a place like that. 40:05 Like I could never talk my in-laws into living in a place like that. 40:08 I don't, you know, I come from a farm in a small town. 40:14 My appreciation and love for cities is something that I have grown into, not something I was born into or in a sense like indoctrinated in. 40:24 And the vast majority of people who are living in the suburbs, whether it's true or not, look at crime statistics in the city and say, I can't live there. 40:34 Look at neighborhoods that are dirty and gritty and where the trash doesn't get picked up. 40:38 And I don't want anything to do with that. 40:41 Yeah. 40:42 And I think if you look around the world, there are certainly places that are extraordinarily urban and wonderful. 40:48 Think about Japanese cities, 40:49 a lot of Asian cities that just don't tolerate the sort of disorder that we 40:53 tolerate. 40:54 And they do that because then they're actually more accessible to more people and 40:58 more enjoyable. 40:59 I think you had Chris Arnott as your main speaker this year. 41:03 And I think Chris is a brilliant writer. 41:06 And I think he's really turned into one of the best observers and writers of what's going on. 41:11 He writes about this a lot in his tours and his walks around the world and high 41:15 trust versus low trust societies, some that seem to be functioning versus others that are not. 41:21 To me, it's a critical element. 41:23 If you call yourself an urbanist, you've got to care about this stuff. 41:26 Yeah. 41:26 Yeah. 41:27 That high trust. 41:28 I mean, I feel like there's another, to me, there's another layer here. 41:33 When you were talking before, I was thinking about basically the competent government layer, right? 41:38 Like how do we competently deliver core services of government? 41:44 And I, you know, if I have one like main critique of local government, it's that we've tried to fly before we crawl, you know, like, like just do the things that people need, do them competently. 41:56 And then you can like layer on top of that more difficult tricks. 42:01 Right. 42:02 But like pick up the trash, like go out and fix the crack sidewalks. 42:05 Like these are just like basic human things. 42:08 What Arnati talks about this culture of trust to me is like a fascinating next 42:15 layer down, which is how do we culturally relate to each other? 42:20 And I think you see, 42:23 it's interesting because I think in the U S where I have found the highest cultures 42:29 of trust, have been in two very different places. 42:32 One I would say is like monolithic suburban subdivisions where everybody's kind of 42:38 a bit the same and you have this trust because of the sameness factor. 42:43 But you also find it in a lot of poor neighborhoods. 42:46 I would say I've been in neighborhoods in Memphis and in Shreveport, in Buffalo that are really high trust places. 42:55 But it's high trust because of the kind of social kneading. 43:01 I'm kneading dough in my hands. 43:04 The fact that you live in this neighborhood with people that you run into and 43:07 interact with and you've built up, 43:10 you've in a sense like vested the time and the place to build that social trust. 43:14 Yeah. 43:15 It's hard. 43:17 It's really, I mean, this is the conservative argument that 43:21 of civilization you know the chesterton's fence uh kind of argument where it's really really hard to build civilization it's really really easy to tear it down and and i feel like a lot of what we see is there were a lot of underlying uh 43:39 sinews that held things together that we've kind of casually ripped apart right and 43:47 The casualty is that level of trust that is essential to making a city work. 43:53 Yeah. 43:53 Yeah. 43:54 Yeah, I agree. 43:55 Let me put it this way. 43:57 You can't replace that level of trust with... 44:00 competent government. 44:02 And I think this is Jane Jacobs eyes on the street is like a prime example of 44:06 people get their minds around. 44:07 The reason eyes on the street work is yes, 44:10 partially because you've got opacity in the windows and you've got people there 44:15 that are like looking out onto the street. 44:17 But another like part of why it works is because I trust that if I'm, you know, getting beat up or mugged on the street, like you're actually going to come out and help. 44:28 You know, like you would intervene in that. 44:30 Or if you see someone stealing something, you would speak up. 44:33 Or if you see someone, you know, if the neighbor kid's over doing something they shouldn't do, like I'm going to step out and talk to them. 44:39 When you remove that, you can even have good design. 44:41 I mean, I'm thinking like Philadelphia to me is one of the most exquisitely designed cities. 44:48 It's also one of the places where I've seen like the lowest level of social trust. 44:51 Yeah. 44:51 So you can have design for eyes on the street, but if you don't actually have that layer of social trust, it's incomplete. 44:59 Yeah. 44:59 And we designers always think everything's about design. 45:03 We can think you can out design your way out of any problem. 45:05 Ian Rasmussen said this to me once. 45:07 It's like if design solved everything, explain Baltimore. 45:10 Yeah. 45:10 Because Baltimore is like exquisitely designed. 45:12 It's a beautiful city. 45:14 It is. 45:14 It's remarkable. 45:15 And so and a lot of that ties. 45:18 I think one of the things that you said in the book were these kind of three legs 45:21 of the financial, the policy and the cultural. 45:24 And I think that's important. 45:26 I think that's a it's really the right observation of how these all interact. 45:31 And we don't talk about the cultural very much. 45:33 There are a few people. 45:34 I think Aaron Wren, in whose newsletter, is one of the few that really writes about culture issues commonly, especially as they relate to cities. 45:44 But most people don't really want to talk about it. 45:46 We seem to not want to touch that topic. 45:47 But it really is essential. 45:49 We're human beings, after all. 45:51 Yeah. 45:52 Let me give an olive branch to you. 45:55 people who might be hearing us say this and say, Oh, you're, you're veering into Charlie Kirk territory, Chuck. 46:02 This is like conservative talk. 46:05 I think, and I wrote in my first book, 46:08 I think that cities don't function well unless you have people of both progressive 46:13 instinct and conservative instinct. 46:15 I think you need people who are dedicated to like building the lattice structure of society. 46:23 How do we have a functioning system that will work and endure? 46:29 And the thing about anytime you build a system, it will negatively impact people, particularly on the margins. 46:36 Right. 46:37 You need a progressive instinct to say, hey, hey, hey, you're leaving behind this person. 46:43 Hey, this system might work for the majority, but it's not working over here. 46:47 And I think that when we have a city that works, 46:49 you've got both of those instincts kind of in tension with each other in a block, 46:54 in a neighborhood. 46:55 But in a way where there's a dialogue happening, 46:58 there's a conversation happening so that we do maintain the structure of society 47:03 while also tending to those that are left behind, those that are not benefiting, that kind of thing. 47:11 Yeah, we don't do it perfectly. 47:13 Right. 47:13 Right. 47:14 And yeah, I think the I mean, 47:15 the way I put it is progressive and conservative are two sides of the same human 47:19 human coin. 47:20 Exactly. 47:21 And, you know, we we do ourselves a disservice in big cities that are basically entirely progressive where conservatives don't feel like they have a voice. 47:30 And by the same token, 47:32 when you have conservative places and progressives feel like they don't have a 47:36 voice, 47:36 then we really miss out on the opportunities to actually make really good places 47:41 that work for everybody. 47:42 Right. 47:43 Well, you get the extremes becoming normalized. 47:46 Right. 47:49 is you know it's something that comes from an like extreme point of view um it is uh something that we normalized for a while and actually like seriously entertained until we went to neighborhoods that struggled and they said oh my gosh we depend on 48:05 the police yeah we could use reforms in these and these and these areas but like we 48:09 have to have policing yeah um so yeah you you i do think that I'll say this as someone who lives in a small town. 48:19 I think we are damaged by the fact that my district voted like 70%, you know, red in the last election. 48:30 What it does is it takes the diversity of thought and just polarizes it. 48:36 Cause you can be a lunatic on the right and you're going to win and you can be a 48:42 lunatic on the left and you're going to lose. 48:45 but at least you'll get attention. 48:47 If you are a moderate on either of those sides, you're not going to, you know, you're not going to matter. 48:52 Like it's not, you have no place in the system when it's that lopsided. 48:56 Yeah, no doubt. 48:58 No doubt. 48:58 All right. 48:59 I want to talk about one design related thing just for fun. 49:02 We'll finish on a lighter topic. 49:04 All right. 49:05 So I was just in DC last week for a conference for the International Downtown 49:10 Association, really great group. 49:12 Wonderful group. 49:13 I don't know if you've ever been there. 49:14 No, I haven't. 49:15 It's an awesome group. 49:16 And I'm always it's remarkable to me. 49:18 Like there's almost nobody from the new urbanist world that attends, which is bizarre. 49:22 Yeah, it seems like our home territory. 49:24 It does. 49:25 And it's really a great group of people who are very practical and they're doers. 49:29 And, you know, I always learn a ton from this group of people. 49:33 Um, but you know, it gave me a time to, you know, I had some time to walk around DC, which is just an incredible city, just absolutely gorgeous. 49:41 And it always going to DC always brings up the topic of the, the idea of a height limit for buildings. 49:48 Uh, 49:48 so this is like the never ending is the forever debate in architecture and urban 49:53 planning, which is, you know, DC has a hard cap on the height of the buildings. 49:58 Uh, so you don't have skyscrapers within the district. 50:01 Um, and it's, so it has a very European city kind of feel to it. 50:05 And it's, it is wonderful. 50:07 It is astounding. 50:08 It's a wonderful city to walk around in. 50:10 It is our monumental city. 50:12 Right. 50:12 Yeah. 50:13 Um, and, but that's, it's also, that is unique to the district and nowhere else really in the country. 50:19 So it always kind of begs the question about, you know, 50:22 would our cities be better if we followed the Leon career mindset and you had like 50:26 a six story hard cap, um, Uh, because that's the limits of what people can walk up. 50:31 Um, which is not, that's not a typical American approach. 50:35 We like bigness. 50:36 We love skyscrapers. 50:37 They're visually stunning. 50:38 How do you think about that topic? 50:43 Um, 50:46 So when I'm in DC and I get in this, cause I went and gave a housing trap presentation in DC. 50:52 And of course this topic comes up because there's a, there's a strong Yimby contingent. 50:57 That's like, you know, the cap is killing us. 50:59 Right. 51:00 And I said, you know, look, we are at a Metro stop. 51:04 We're like, we're like 500 feet from a Metro stop in a library. 51:09 That's a nice building. 51:10 But if we walk out of this library across the street is a one story strip mall. 51:15 And we can walk throughout this neighborhood and everything in this neighborhood is 51:19 like one or two stories. 51:21 We are three minutes, five minutes from like the main, you know, like we're right on the Metro line. 51:28 Like we can get to anywhere in DC in 15 minutes. 51:32 On the metro, 51:33 why in the world are you obsessed with taking that neighborhood over there next to the Lincoln Memorial and next to the White House and the Capitol building and 51:42 making a skyscraper there? 51:44 Why aren't you obsessed with taking this one-story strip mall across the street and 51:48 making that into a six-story building, which is clearly ready to do? 51:52 All the land value economics would say, this is not the highest and best use. 51:57 Let's get that redeveloped. 51:58 Let's change that. 51:59 That should be our obsession. 52:01 I feel like the, to me, there's, there's two things. 52:06 And, and again, having respect for people who love Manhattan and I, I find Manhattan stunning. 52:12 Oh, it's incredible. 52:14 But I find it also like overwhelming in a lot of ways. 52:18 Um, 52:19 I think it's very clear when you look at the economics of these skyscrapers that 52:26 these are, you know, Leon Krier called them vertical sprawl, right? 52:30 They are buildings that have a pass-fail kind of condition to them, particularly the ones we have built post-World War II, where I would argue the materials get cheaper and cheaper, less, you know, we're not building them out of rock and, you know, 52:44 we're building them in ways that like they will... 52:47 they will need to be taken down at some point because they just won't be able to stand anymore. 52:55 To me, it's a little bit like a mining company that is like, 52:59 we're extracting the mining stuff from the ground and then we'll declare bankruptcy right when we got to clean it up and do the tailings and remediate the acid we 53:09 dumped in the groundwater. 53:10 I feel like there's a cashflow model for a skyscraper that works for over maybe even 40 or 50 years, but then ends. 53:22 And when it ends, there is no cash flowing model to actually go in and make the building work. 53:28 And I think we're starting to see that in, not in New York where there's still tremendous demand, 53:33 but I think we're seeing it in other places where they built them where they were 53:36 not warranted. 53:38 The other aspect of this is that when you build When you build a neighborhood of six story buildings that is walkable, you're, you're, you're never going to be overwhelmed with cars because you can, at that, at that density of that thickness, 53:54 you can actually have the predominant be walking in transit. 53:58 Right. 53:59 Like, I mean, you can, it's viable to have neighborhood businesses with that level of intensity. 54:03 Right. 54:04 You can have people who almost no one would need a car. 54:09 You build neighborhoods that are financially just killer. 54:13 that are really resilient and adaptable that can become like many different things over time. 54:23 You're building neighborhoods that I think will be here 200 years from now. 54:28 I don't think we say the same thing about skyscraper neighborhoods. 54:31 I just, I just don't, I mean, we've not seen it. 54:34 So maybe a hundred years from now, we'll look back and be like, Oh yeah, that was, they figured out how to fix all those windows and do all that stuff. 54:41 I'm, 54:43 I am one who defaults to what we know works. 54:46 And what we know works is Paris. 54:48 What we know works is what they build in Washington, D.C. 54:51 Right. 54:52 And there's kind of a tie to the earlier conversation then that is you have some of 54:58 these areas that really feel mature at like six story areas. 55:02 And like, do they really need more? 55:04 They've kind of done their part to mature up to that level. 55:07 What we really need to do is thicken up the other areas that are less mature and 55:12 make them more valuable. 55:13 Yeah, that would, I mean, that's a strong towns approach. 55:16 That's exactly what I would do. 55:17 And when you, when you're talking about that maturing, I mean, you, you, you look at a six story building in DC and you're like, okay, we're, we're peaked out here. 55:25 What do we do? 55:25 Well, what you see happening is that they become higher end buildings with better transit. 55:31 Right. 55:32 And so, like, you do see it continue to evolve. 55:36 But what you should see that they're not seeing in D.C. 55:39 to the rate that they should is that pressure to build should intensify out. 55:46 That, I mean, this is Strong Towns 101. 55:50 Cities grow incrementally up. 55:51 They grow incrementally out. 55:52 And they become incrementally more intense. 55:54 Right. 55:54 When you reach that limit of up, as you have in D.C., as you have in Paris, 55:59 what happens is that the other two dimensions of maturing and thickening up as you 56:05 go out, those start to predominate. 56:09 When you don't allow those, like in D.C., when you're not embracing that, when that's not part of the pattern, then you get this dysfunction about, you know, okay, there's not a place to live, prices are really high, 56:20 and we need to build skyscrapers now right next to Lincoln Memorial. 56:24 Yeah. 56:25 Yeah. 56:26 Yeah. 56:26 All right. 56:27 Well, that's, uh, I think we're anachronistic when it comes to that stuff. 56:32 Like I, I do feel like, 56:35 the most controversial article that I wrote at strong towns in like the, the middle years. 56:40 So I, I feel like there's an early strong towns, there's a middle strong towns, and then there's a current, the middle years, 56:46 the most controversial article I ever wrote was one talking about floating height 56:50 limits. 56:51 Yeah. 56:52 And the, the precursors of the Yimby's descended on me. 56:58 as being like brutally out of touch and lacking compassion for people and, 57:03 you know, trying to put my values on them and, you know, not understanding how markets work. 57:09 And I mean, there was, it was this endless litany of anger towards me about it. 57:13 And I don't know, you know, I visit all these places and, Like you say, we can go walk around the skyscrapers in downtown Kansas City, and then we can go half a mile in any direction. 57:26 And we see neighborhoods that need a lot of love and a lot of care. 57:30 And there's only so much capital. 57:32 There's only so many people who do sheetrock, right? 57:36 There's only so many people doing masonry. 57:40 And where do you want them deployed? 57:41 Do you want them deployed there? 57:43 Or do you want them deployed throughout a neighborhood making it awesome? 57:51 Anything else we need to, does that make sense? 57:52 It does. 57:53 I, I, you know, 57:54 there's some of these things that where I have not always kind of figured out how 57:58 to, uh, cross the threshold is there's things that make sense in my head. 58:02 And then, then there's that damn Midwestern practical side of me, which is like, okay, how do we do that? 58:08 How do you exactly, how do you exactly do that without causing 10 other problems in the process? 58:14 Well, yeah, I think, you know, to me, the answer to that, and this is just going to be, 58:21 there's people who are already upset with you and me who are going to roll their 58:24 eyes at this. 58:25 I think localizing things as much as you can is how you solve it. 58:29 Because This is my first book, and I remember getting this feedback. 58:34 People didn't like the word harmonizing that I used. 58:37 I said, a traditional city, a good, complex, adaptive traditional city, harmonizes many competing interests at the same time. 58:47 I insisted on using the word harmonize because it doesn't solve them. 58:52 It actually just says like, you have attention, I have attention, 58:56 and we're going to find some harmony where you can live with a little bit of your attention and I can live with a little bit of mine to make this place work. 59:04 But then when one tension gets out of whack, there's a response that The more you can localize those, 59:10 the more you empower people to actually respond and adapt and deal with tension and 59:15 stress and opportunity. 59:17 And I think the, you know, to me, the diagnosis of why our cities, 59:21 like why don't our cities work today is because we've eliminated all the feedback 59:26 loops. 59:27 We made them all national. 59:28 We made them all statewide. 59:30 And so the feedback loops are, I've got pain. 59:34 I'm not allowed to respond to that pain in any way, 59:37 except for voting for Trump or Harris or going to the state Capitol and supporting 59:42 some legislation that maybe at some point will trickle down and make my neighborhood work better. 59:46 And I just think that's like a really crappy way to build a city. 59:49 Yeah. 59:49 And I think even at the local level in a big city, like the one that I live in, that has half a million people in it, it's a similar thing. 59:55 It's just everything is handled at city hall. 59:58 So you have a chance to vote for a mayor and, and maybe your councilman and you think, you know, 60:03 that's going to fix it all in a city of a half million people where they're making 60:07 a hundred decisions a day. 60:08 Yeah. 60:10 And there's still, even then, 60:12 there's not as much localization of effort and outcome as you might expect. 60:17 I'm sympathetic to that. 60:18 I think, you know, Andrew Burleson and I have argued a lot in the last year because, you know, he will say, Chuck, you don't understand for San Francisco. 60:27 It is just like a political mess and you can't get anything done. 60:30 And the city is the problem. 60:32 And I'm like, OK, I hear you. 60:33 Like, I get that. 60:35 I can see where the city government would itself. 60:39 I was at the Dallas city hall meeting with their staff and I walked out of there 60:42 going, Oh my gosh, this is a train wreck. 60:45 Um, I really like what Minneapolis has done. 60:49 You know, I don't think it's perfect, 60:51 but they've really tried to have in a sense like neighborhood level governance. 60:58 What decisions can we allow neighborhood groups to make? 61:02 Can we staff those from city hall with people who would be like liaisons that can, can we give them part of the budget where they can actually like actualize their 61:11 priorities? 61:12 It's not perfect. 61:14 But I feel like it's trending in the right direction, which is, you know, how do we give people the I have we have stress here. 61:23 How do we respond to it? 61:26 If you're telling me in Kansas City, 61:28 your neighbors aren't that dynamic because City Hall is distant and disconnected. 61:33 I can see that. 61:34 Mm hmm. 61:35 I mean, my biggest criticism of Cincinnati has been, or I'm sorry, 61:39 of Kansas City is that they have invested so much out on the edge in building new 61:46 subdivisions and, you know, like they're neglecting their core neighborhoods. 61:49 Yeah. 61:50 All right. 61:50 Well, I got to learn more about the Minneapolis model then. 61:52 That sounds like some interesting homework for me. 61:55 We're not perfect in Minnesota, but we like to say we're above average. 62:00 I know that line very well. 62:02 Chuck, I think I have to get you to another meeting. 62:04 So we should probably wrap there. 62:06 Any final words? 62:08 Just thank you. 62:08 It's always, I mean, I don't ever want to come to Kansas City without sitting down with you. 62:13 And yeah, I really appreciate you inviting me and taking the time. 62:18 And we will... 62:19 If we don't see each other at CNU, we will see each other some other place soon, I'm sure. 62:23 That's too bad we don't have a playoff game to go to this week. 62:27 I feel bad that our baseball teams are both... 62:31 I would say mine is pathetic. 62:33 Yours is slightly above that. 62:34 We are right at mediocre. 62:36 Yeah, you're a solid mediocre, which we aspire to now. 62:40 I understand that. 62:41 I understand that. 62:42 Well, I'm a Kansas University football fan, and mediocrity is like the height of what we could possibly hope 62:49 So we dropped the youngest off at the university of Arizona. 62:53 And so I'm becoming familiar with Kansas football because it was never, 62:56 of course, now we're in the same conference. 62:58 We're the same conference. 62:59 I was always a big 10 person because that's where my gophers are. 63:02 Yeah. 63:03 It's very weird. 63:04 Yeah. 63:05 It's a weird pairing. 63:06 Yeah. 63:06 We're going to be out there for parents weekend where I think BYU is going to kick 63:09 Arizona's butt, but we'll see. 63:11 Who knows? 63:11 Yeah. 63:12 Who knows? 63:13 All right, Chuck. 63:13 Thanks so much. 63:14 Take care, man. 63:14 All right. 63:14 See ya. 63:51 We'll be right back.
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