0:00 [music] 0:28 Hi there, and welcome to The Dishcast. 0:32 I want to thank you for subscribing. 0:34 You know, we don't have any ads here. 0:36 We don't have any sponsors. 0:37 We're not... 0:39 Being subsidized by Paramount Plus or Pierre Omidyar and all the other muckety-mucks that are coming into Substack and financing and sponsoring all these other entities. 0:49 We're still what we always were, which is you and me. 0:52 I thank you for that deeply from the bottom of my heart. 0:55 Chris and I both are grateful for your continuing support. 0:58 I know I piss you off. 1:00 I know I upset people. 1:02 I know I can be polarizing, which makes it all the more Amazing that you stick with me, and we're so grateful for the fact that you do. 1:11 If you haven't subscribed and want to support these conversations, please, please, please do. 1:16 If you haven't, this conversation will cut off just when you think it's getting interesting, because we do that deliberately. 1:23 We have some great guests coming up. 1:26 We're going to talk about, were the Gospels actually accurate? 1:29 We're going to talk about Blaise Pascal and his amazing work and life. 1:36 We're going to talk about Aristotle and the history of transcendental meditation in the West, as well as Paul Garcia Ryan and Anna Hutchinson, who are really remarkable therapists. 1:48 Who are involved with therapy for children with gender dysphoria. 1:52 The kids that are gay or possibly trans in their childhood. 1:57 That are being groomed to take irreversible medical decisions before puberty. 2:04 And their position is that they should be talking, talking, talking and helping, counseling, counseling without irreversible interventions that they cannot. 2:14 Turned back. 2:15 And so I'm going to talk to them and just what is going on with kids and gender dysphoria? 2:20 How can we best help them? 2:23 In the great debate over this, it seems to me that we need to say, well, what do we all actually agree on in helping these kids? 2:31 Because I think we all want to help them. 2:34 So that's what we're going to try and do. 2:36 But today, a person I've long been fascinated by, I've read a His first book, anyway, I haven't read the last two, although I've now crammed them for this podcast. 2:47 His name is Gregory Clark, and he's an economic historian. 2:50 And he's currently the Danish National Research Foundation Professor in Economics at Southern Denmark University. 2:58 He's a visiting professor in the Economic History Department at the London School of Economics and a distinguished professor emeritus at UC Davis. 3:08 He is a really interesting and provocative scholar, a nerd of quite prodigious capacity. 3:16 Gregory, thank you so much for joining us. Thank you. 3:20 It's great to be here. 3:22 Tell us about where you grew up and your parents. 3:25 What did they do? 3:27 Yes, part of my current interest is actually related to the unusual family that I came from. 3:34 So I grew up in the West of Scotland, part of the Irish Catholic diaspora. 3:41 I'm with you, brother. 3:43 That's me too. Right. 3:45 And I mean, we were the first Catholic family on the street of 30 Protestant houses. 3:53 I knew I loved you for some reason, but come on, carry on. 3:56 Already when we moved in, my mother at a very young age had four children and Which was double the number of children than anyone in any of the other. 4:05 It's like that Monty Python sketch, right? 4:08 I know. 4:11 But I just say, the thing that actually... 4:14 Ludiel, wife, every time they have sex, they have a kid. 4:18 It kept going on, they'd fall over the place. 4:21 Well, every time we have sex, we have a kid. 4:25 We've got one. 4:26 Sorry. 4:29 Sorry. 4:30 I'm interrupting you. 4:31 Carry on. Please tell me. 4:33 So the interesting feature of my family is that both of my parents came from families of 12. 4:40 And in fact, they were both number nine in these families. 4:45 And I didn't know my paternal grandmother, a crusty old lady. 4:52 And so I asked her once, can you tell me anything about my father as a young boy? 4:58 And her answer was no. 5:02 His entire childhood left no memory. 5:07 And in fact, she was very fond of her oldest son, who was actually a child prodigy, the oldest son. 5:14 But I'm afraid my paternal grandfather was not a very smart guy. 5:17 And so he took them all out of school, even though they were academically very able at the minimum age. 5:25 To work in his grocery business. 5:28 And so he ended up having five stores that were extensively stemmed by these children. 5:36 But the interesting thing was that a bunch of the people in that family had quite significant intellectual ability. 5:46 And so an interesting kind of question then was, well, hold on, given this mother who had essentially no interest in children when she bore them and the father who was busy all the time with his business, you know, how come these people could actually still turn out and have kind 6:04 of intellectual abilities and interests and succeed in life? 6:09 But that was this background. 6:11 And so then, in the meritocratic British education system, I went from there to become an undergraduate at King's College in Cambridge, Where at that stage in the 70s, we still had servants. 6:27 He had multiple rooms in our senior year if we wanted a suite to live in. 6:32 And then I moved on to Harvard, where again, we lived a life of realms of privilege. 6:38 You know about that a little bit. 6:41 And so in some sense, people then challenged and said, but you claim that in Britain, going back all the way till 1600s, Social mobility rates are actually very low. 6:56 Given your own family background, how can you say that? 6:59 Because it turns out my paternal grandfather for at least one year was a coal miner. 7:04 But it turns out if you look back to the village they came from in Ireland, they were the elite in that village. 7:11 They were the landowners. 7:12 They were the schoolmaster. 7:14 Half the people in the village were called Clark, but the Clarks were running the place. 7:20 And so in some sense, in relative position, things haven't actually changed that much over time. 7:29 Let me, the premise of that point you make is your view that there has been almost no social mobility. 7:37 In the United Kingdom for 500 years. 7:40 Now, again, I would say, hold on a minute. 7:43 My grandmother, also born in Tralee, seventh of 13, came over, barely read and write, cleaning lady. 7:53 I got an award for PhD at Harvard, right? 7:57 I'm a grandson. 7:58 So it's like part of me thinks, well, in my own head, That was because I was given opportunities that were denied her or denied my mother. 8:06 I mean, my mother, like you had to go to work as soon as, however bright she was. 8:12 But it never occurred to me, in fact, that something deeper was going on. 8:14 Let's take a big step back. 8:18 Before we get into the question of social mobility. Sure. 8:21 We can return to that. 8:23 Yeah. 8:23 And ask about the big question, which is, and I don't know whether you've been watching this. 8:26 I've been watching this PBS series called Evolution. 8:29 It's a new Nova special. 8:32 It's actually beautiful and brilliant. 8:34 And it's very fascinating. 8:36 I find evolution just a staggeringly brilliant and beautiful theory that I find constantly fascinating. Interesting. 8:46 The way in which just randomness, random variations given changing environments can change things, not on an individual level, but on a species-wide level all over the place. 8:58 It's absolutely unexpected stuff, weird stuff, new stuff. 9:02 You know, the current horse, which comes from a fish, started out some sort of fish. 9:09 And then once it became a horse, it then underwent further breeding in which it now has a flatter back and a bigger butt so we can ride it. 9:15 And then it became a new species under our guidance, et cetera, et cetera. 9:19 I find all this stuff, I'm a complete nerd for it. 9:23 So tell me, we have a Ralph Flee now, we keep pushing it back. 9:27 We think now it's 300,000 years of humans, maybe more. 9:31 Are we the same? 9:33 As we were two or three hundred years ago. 9:36 I mean, that's what we kind of assume, but are we? 9:40 Well, I was driven to contemplate this question by the puzzle of the Industrial Revolution. 9:47 And, you know, it's the great prize in economic history would be to come up with a really satisfactory theory of the one event that seemed to actually matter in the history of the world. 9:59 Why did it take 300,000 years to get there? 10:03 That's the real question. 10:04 That is the amazing question. 10:06 And so my first book, first of all, it emphasized that human living standards have not improved in material terms all the way across several hundred thousand years up until 1800. 10:21 And so, you know, we weren't able to change that aspect of life. 10:27 And... 10:28 Also, the surprising thing is, I mean, economists give a lot of weight to institutions and institutional developments. 10:35 One of the things that I could see convincingly is that medieval England probably had better institutions than modern England does. 10:44 I mean, the average tax rate in medieval England was about 1%. 10:48 Did the rate effectively collect it? 10:53 I mean, it was collected, but Parliament was actually controlling the ability of the king to tax, and Parliament was very anti-tax. 11:02 The government had played a very limited role. 11:04 Markets worked. 11:07 The justice system had all kinds of peculiarities, but when you look at land tenure, you can see in villages for hundreds of years that land passed peaceably from one person to another. 11:19 But it does turn out that there are some strange things that are very different in this earlier world. 11:26 And one is the prevailing rate of interest is much, much higher than in modern societies. 11:32 People are just systematically much more impatient in this earlier world. 11:38 And so the risk-free rate of interest in medieval England was 10%. 11:43 If you go back to ancient Babylonia, that rate of interest seems to have been about 20%. 11:49 And so one thing you do actually see is that people somehow are behaving very differently. 11:55 They're capable of taking more risks economically a little bit. 12:00 They're cooperating with each other to figure out how to be more efficient in agriculture, etc., etc. 12:05 I mean, after the Black Death especially, right, laborers got more power and there was a real shift. 12:11 Yeah, I mean, look, well, after the economy adjusts incredibly quickly to the Black Death, I mean, the population gets swept away the next year, all the wages have increased, the prices of various commodities have all changed, and the world carries on. 12:26 And, you know, so that's what I say is interesting, is then when you look at the innovations of the Industrial Revolution, they're not super sophisticated, right? 12:36 And so it just increases this puzzle about why weren't these earlier societies able to... 12:42 Explain why they weren't sophisticated, first of all. 12:44 Well, I mean, they're not unsophisticated, but if you look at the innovations in cotton textiles, which were the premier ones in Britain in that period... 12:56 None of it depends on any kind of knowledge of science. 13:00 It all just depends on working with fibers and practical ways, trying to figure out ways to twist them and straighten them. 13:09 And it could have been done by the Romans in terms of the actual technologies that they had. 13:15 It could have been done by the Greeks. 13:17 It could have been done by the Egyptians. 13:20 And so I see that there is this puzzle And so one aspect we see is that people behave differently in terms of impatience. 13:29 They're also much more violent in these earlier societies. 13:34 And so even though England has peace and it's not invaded, people are clubbing each other to death at much higher rates than they are subsequently. 13:44 And this was a society where the king actually collected the assets of anyone who engaged in a felony and And so they kept pretty good records of felonies for that reason. 13:58 And so we actually can see that these rates of murder are actually declining over time. 14:05 And so again, people are changing their behaviors. 14:09 Another thing is people's grasp of things like numbers. 14:14 And also, they would claim in this early world, and it shows up in the fact that in ancient Rome, in the upper classes, more than half of people didn't know what age they were when they died. 14:30 And also, they would claim fantastical ages. 14:33 I mean, in a society where the average life expectancy was 30, There are people who on their tombs are carved, you know, died at 150 years. 14:42 You could easily check that that would have meant that they'd lived through various famous battles. 14:48 And so, as I say, you do see this progression within this world. 14:54 And another feature is we learn to love work somehow. 14:59 If you go back to the earliest societies, the indications are that people actually just don't work that many hours a day. 15:07 We spend a lot of time sitting around. 15:09 It's like, you know, teenagers just hanging around, gossiping about each other. 15:15 Sounds lovely. 15:18 Complaining they're hungry, asking who's going to hunt. 15:22 And so there have been these complex of changes where by 1800, the average workday is 10 hours a day and people work six days a week for almost all of the year. 15:36 This is why people talk about the terrors of civilization, because it took us from a largely healthy, indolent, picking-our-nose lifestyle, as it were, to this fucking rat race that we're all in. 15:55 But something happened to human nature... 15:59 That's what's interesting. 16:01 And so the thing that got me interested was we were able to find an interesting set of data. 16:12 And that interesting set of data is there's an enormous number of wills that have been made in England and actually preserved. 16:20 You know, at least in the pre-industrial period, probably at least 10 million of these wills. 16:26 And, you know, quite a large fraction of the population were making wills. 16:29 A lot of them were illiterate, but they'd have someone else write out the will. 16:34 And these wills reveal, say, for someone in 1600, how much wealth they have, their occupational status. 16:44 It'll also tell you if they're illiterate. 16:46 But the other interesting thing is it tells you how many children they had. 16:50 Hmm. 16:51 Because their prime objective in people seems to be in these wills was to leave assets to their children. 16:58 And these people had lots of servants and kind of collateral relatives. 17:02 But it's interesting. It's like sociobiology. 17:04 The ones they care about are the ones who are genetically connected to them. 17:09 And what's interesting then is we can do a count. 17:13 And what you find is a very strong gradient where the richest people live. 17:19 That makes the 17:23 kind of sense, right? 17:24 Because they're going to be better fed, they're going to be better nourished, they may have access to education. 17:30 I mean, they're better able to support more kids, right? 17:34 Yes. 17:36 And it's actually not clear exactly why they ended up with spending more children, but they have almost doubled the number of children of the average person in this society. 17:47 So the wealthy 17:48 are outbreeding the rest, is what you're saying? 17:50 Yes, yes. 17:51 And you can trace in the data that this is true in 1300 as well. 17:57 And since that book came out, A Farewell to Arms, back in 2007, people have looked at this in other societies, and it's a general feature of pre-industrial society, is that higher status, higher income people outproduce in children lower status people. 18:17 And so that then says, if social status, for example, is transmitted mainly genetically, then you have this inherent dynamic in this pre-industrial world where the kind of attitudes, the kind of abilities that lead to kind 18:35 of economic success are actually kind of becoming a larger and larger part of the population. 18:43 Just by this process. 18:45 And that eventually in 1800, the people who are the laborers there, they're mostly the descendants of the middle and upper classes of the Middle Ages, because there's only a limited number of high status jobs in these societies. 18:59 And so eventually, as I say, you get this kind of downward mobility inherent to these societies that Where people of more talent than ability are becoming a larger fraction of the population, of the society. 19:16 How much impact does primogeniture have on that? 19:20 Because in England, it was quite often that they would give their wealth to their eldest son. 19:29 Well, here I actually have to correct you. Amazingly in these worlds... 19:36 When you're not looking at, say, the very top, you know, 0.1 of a percent of the society, there's surprisingly little preference for firstborn. 19:48 And we've confirmed that since then. 19:51 And so it's true of England in the 19th century as well, that basically the firstborn maybe gets like a 10% premium of assets, but they give roughly equally to all children. 20:04 So even when there's a family of 12, number 12 gets pretty much as much as everyone before them. 20:11 And in some sense, if you think about modern parents, that would seem to make a lot of sense that, you know, I care about all my children. 20:18 You know, I don't care about what order they were born in. 20:22 If they can remember their children. 20:25 Yes. 20:27 They haven't lost track of who's who. 20:31 Sorry. Anyway, go on. 20:35 So as I say, and this is a hypothesis, right? 20:39 But it's an interesting hypothesis that will ultimately be testable because there are kind of markers of the genetics that create people with kind of lower time preference rates or with higher levels of educations. 20:58 And you should then be able to observe that that differs across the population and also the frequency of these markers are actually increasing over time. 21:10 But these are just markers. 21:13 You can't do any genetic analysis of a million wills, right? 21:19 You can't analyze the wills, but now people have begun collecting genetic material from skeletons. 21:25 Okay. 21:26 And so now you can actually look and say, do we see systematic signs of change? 21:31 Now, that's quite tricky. 21:33 So I'm not going to say exactly, you know, there's a lot of debate about exactly how to do that and how to avoid kind of getting false results. 21:42 But there are actually now claims that you can actually witness signs of human evolution and In the past 20,000 years. 21:52 Oh, yeah. 21:52 Well, we know that things like lactose intolerance and a bunch of other stuff. 21:55 Oh, sure. All that stuff is obvious. 21:57 The question is whether... 21:59 But my point is simply this. 22:01 You are using markers to figure that out, not direct measurement. 22:05 Oh, no, no. 22:06 All I was saying is that it'll be a testable hypothesis and then ultimately someone will figure out, is this correct or is this wrong? 22:15 The alternative story for England In this period would be, this is just cultural transmission. 22:23 There's a group of people who have different attitudes, different culture. 22:27 They transmit those to their children. 22:29 And that then diffuses down through the society. 22:33 And it is purely a kind of a cultural achievement than the Industrial Revolution. 22:38 It's actually created by this process. 22:42 And so the latest book that I've been working on then is He's actually really trying to kind of seek to test that question. 22:52 When we inherit from our parents, do we inherit because we inherit certain cultural attitudes or is it just the genetics that we inherited from them? 23:02 Presumably both, right? 23:04 It's just a question of the balance. 23:07 We will inherit cultural assumptions from our parents and we will inherit genetics. 23:13 Yeah, though in the latest book, the interesting thing is the evidence actually seems to say it's almost all genetic transmissions. 23:22 And very little kind of that can be explained just as cultural transmission. 23:26 This is a little the same argument 23:28 they say where parents don't worry about your kids. 23:32 Don't worry about their education. 23:34 It won't change much at all. 23:35 They will end up the same anyway, right? They'll be fine. 23:38 And it's just intuitively wrong. 23:40 It's like that's not the case. 23:44 Yeah, except, you know, I mean, it's an affliction in modern America that people... 23:52 Vastly overestimate the effects of selective schooling and selective treatment of children in terms of what their ultimate outcomes will be. 24:04 And in some sense it would be, since now we're worried about no one's having children anymore, if we could make people just sit back a little bit and say, look, it really doesn't matter that much. 24:16 But at the time of conception, the hard work has been done. 24:20 But here's what I would say. 24:24 Okay, let me give you one thought. 24:26 If you look at England, you see, okay, there are institutional factors. 24:30 There's the rule of law. 24:32 There's the establishment of property. There is... 24:34 There's opportunities. 24:36 There's a pretty free market, as it were. 24:38 There are institutions. 24:40 Then you add coffee, for example. 24:43 Everyone stops being shit-faced every day. 24:46 And then you add in cities. 24:48 They begin to talk to each other. Ideas spread. 24:50 And that is how this thing... 24:54 Just suddenly then, boom, someone has this idea there are enough people around who are in the same space to sort of help it explode. 25:04 That's how I would think. 25:05 I wouldn't think of genetics at all in that. 25:08 What am I missing? 25:10 Oh, so they... 25:13 What could easily be the case is that if there is this evolution going on in the pre-industrial period is that it ultimately creates a human agent genetically who has the kind of interests and aptitudes and spirit of cooperation that makes modern civil society possible. 25:37 And without that process, People end up over the most minor disputes stabbing each other to death. 25:45 It's funny, but this is very much close to Steven Pinker's view, right? 25:48 Which is in his grand history of things, which is the most striking thing about humankind since we started off is that we have gotten calmer, gentler, quieter, less violent. 26:01 We are better able over time to direct our attention to non-zero-sum things. 26:08 We are not. 26:09 We are cooperating more. 26:11 We have network, et cetera, et cetera. 26:12 And this is a... 26:14 This is a clear direction in human history. 26:17 I mean, it's not universal. It has up to that. 26:20 But there is very clear that this is happening. 26:23 The question, he doesn't really say why, except institutionally and all sorts of. 26:27 Right. And your point is simply that as the culture shifted, as well as There emerged actual population that was genetically better able to take advantage of these possibilities. 26:40 Right. 26:41 That's the hypothesis. 26:42 And in some sense, this would say that there's an interplay between human institutions and then evolutionary forces. 26:51 That once you have a society which has relatively stable property rights and relatively stable enforcement of law, Then you get these forces coming in where the people who can best operate within that system are reproductively more successful. 27:09 They recreate themselves. 27:14 But that's to say that the force that's doing this is that actual direct genetic inheritance of these characteristics. 27:22 So here's a question someone would ask of that, which is that, okay, somebody's learning their But they marry someone and that person might be completely not like that. 27:32 And so especially when you talk about these downward mobility, they're just marrying people who are not the same as them. 27:39 And therefore, it all is a wash. 27:41 Eventually, it just washes out of the system because you don't have some sort of deal whereby the more capable people only marry the more capable people to produce more people who are more capable, right? 27:54 So what's the missing link here? 27:56 What... 27:58 Well, one thing, so in the latest book, there's a whole section devoted to marriage in England. 28:06 And it turns out, again, England has amazingly good marriage records going back to 1837. 28:13 So because the marriage certificate in England ever since then records the bride and groom's literacies, And it also records the occupations of the bride and groom, but also of their fathers. 28:29 And so you're getting all of this family information on each marriage record. 28:34 And one of the things you can do with those records is to figure out, well, how closely are people assorting? 28:42 In marriage, in England. 28:44 What is that word, assort? Assorting. 28:47 How much do you match to someone who's very similar to you in terms of their social characteristics? 28:53 I see. 28:54 How correlated are you? 28:56 Now, if you look at matching in height, for example, which people think of as still an important thing in mating, I think the correlation between marital partners is only something like 0.2. 29:09 Meaning what? 29:10 Meaning that it's, you know, they're correlated to some degree, but there's a lot of kind of mismatches. 29:16 There's, you know, there's a lot of people who differ in height by six inches one way or the other. 29:21 Yeah, and women, you know, women tend to like taller guys, right? 29:26 But that's interesting there because there's a lot of emphasis on that in kind of dating sites and stuff like that on height. 29:32 But it turns out that people match, well, somewhat loosely on things like height. 29:37 But it turns out if you look at their overall social status, the match is really strong. 29:45 And so basically people match to people, for example, who are as close as their siblings in terms of social status or as close as their parents in terms of social status. 29:57 And so in modern period, You are actually observing somehow a social custom that involves very tight matching in marriage. 30:07 And that actually has a huge set of consequences. 30:11 One of them is that it will result in very slow social mobility. 30:17 Because if you just have two random parents... 30:21 Then you will deviate a lot from either of the parents in terms of your outcomes. 30:27 But if you have two parents who are very similar, then you're going to be similar to them as well. 30:32 But the second interesting consequence... 30:34 Let me just ask one simple question about that before we go on, which is, I thought women married up. 30:40 I thought we had this, you know, we had a kind of pattern where you looked for wealthier people, not as equally wealthy as you. Right. 30:49 So I actually have a whole paper on this topic in PLOS One. 30:54 Hi there. 30:56 This is not the end of this podcast. 30:59 In fact, we're only just getting going. 31:03 If you're a paid subscriber and are hearing this, it means you haven't yet signed up for the package to get our podcast in full. 31:10 No extra charge. 31:11 Just go to andrewsullivan.substack.com forward slash listen, L-I-S-T-E-N, and make sure your podcast is up to date with the Dishcast. 31:22 You'll be able to add it to your Dishcast feed and never hear this message again and go back to exactly what you've been doing. 31:27 And I'd like to thank you too for contributing for so long. 31:32 If you're hearing this message and you haven't yet subscribed and want to listen to the rest of the podcast, Then just subscribe. 31:40 It's very easy. 31:42 AndrewSullivan.substack.com is 50 bucks a year. 31:44 Great value for money. 31:45 You also get with that the entire Weekly Dish every Friday. 31:50 Not just my Weekly column, but also all the comments and dissents on that column. 31:55 You also have a full discussion of the previous week's Dishcast. 31:58 So all those questions you have in your mind can be answered or you can hear and read readers debating what we talked about, sometimes calling me to account. 32:09 Andrewsullivan.substack.com. 32:12 Subscribe and get the whole thing. 32:15 Join the debate. 32:16 Join the fun. 32:18 Subscribe.
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