0:02 [SPEAKER_01]: I'm Jason Pack and this is Disorder. 0:05 [SPEAKER_01]: The podcast where we try to understand our mad, mad, mad, mad world. 0:13 [SPEAKER_01]: Why is it becoming so disordered? 0:16 [SPEAKER_01]: Who is doing the disordering? 0:18 [SPEAKER_01]: And is there anything the rest of us can do about it? 0:21 [SPEAKER_01]: And when it comes to global disorders, it's hard to think of any actor who has punched more above its weight than Putin's Russia. 0:30 [SPEAKER_01]: It invades its neighbors, it interferes in Western politics, it launders money through Western financial systems, undermines elections, promotes rapid partisanship in the countries that we, the listeners live in. 0:44 [SPEAKER_01]: Unfortunately, stirs racial hatred and recently conducts hybrid operations all across Europe. 0:50 [SPEAKER_01]: And what I find fascinating, and this is something that I want to delve into today, is Russia still has the Hotspa 0:58 [SPEAKER_01]: that is destabilizing the world and the West that's hypocritical. 1:03 [SPEAKER_01]: Ten days ago, I was really honored to be joined by Hannah Notte, who came on disorder to explain a crucial part of Putin's wager. 1:12 [SPEAKER_01]: She believes that Russia can or is trying to outlast Ukraine and the West. 1:18 [SPEAKER_01]: Today I'd like to delve deeper inside the Russian system to ask questions like, how durable is Putinism? 1:25 [SPEAKER_01]: Can the war economy keep going? 1:28 [SPEAKER_01]: What did the recent Duma elections tell us? 1:31 [SPEAKER_01]: and why are there suddenly more actual bears rampaging across Russia? 1:37 [SPEAKER_01]: To help us do that, I'm joined by my absolutely favorite Russia expert, Marc Galliotti. 1:45 [SPEAKER_01]: He's a writer, historian, Russia-Watcher extraordinaire, and host of the amazing geopolitical podcast, [SPEAKER_01]: in Moscow's shadows. 1:54 [SPEAKER_01]: I could not. 1:55 [SPEAKER_01]: I thought I could never listen to a solo hosted podcast, which is just the host talking, and that's what you'll think until you check out in Moscow's shadows. 2:05 [SPEAKER_01]: Welcome to Disorder Mark. 2:07 [SPEAKER_00]: Well, great to be here, especially with such a delightfully flattering intro. 2:11 [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, I was told early on in life that flattery will get you everywhere, and ironically with Trump and the White House that has been proven to be more true than false. 2:20 [SPEAKER_01]: True, but you say, I'm already on your podcast. 2:22 [SPEAKER_01]: You didn't need to be flat on me, then I will take it. 2:25 [SPEAKER_01]: I will take it. 2:27 [SPEAKER_01]: So Mark, getting into the disorderly heart of the matter, you have spent decades looking at Russia. 2:36 [SPEAKER_01]: And recently, you've described a system that you call war-putinism. 2:41 [SPEAKER_01]: And this is interesting to me. 2:43 [SPEAKER_01]: Could you explain to us what is the economics and ideology 2:51 [SPEAKER_00]: Well, let me just start by saying that although calling it Putinism or Putinism whatever makes it sound like it is some kind of coherent ideology, it's not. 3:00 [SPEAKER_00]: It is essentially what happens when you have a variety of different prejudices and assumptions coming from the boss and adaptations to external circumstances. 3:11 [SPEAKER_00]: And they kind of amalgamate together until they begin to fall on a certain kind of logic of their own. 3:19 [SPEAKER_00]: But again, as I said, there is no ideology, there is little, no little red blue black or green book. 3:26 [SPEAKER_01]: And it's not something that is actually directly exportable to other characters. 3:30 [SPEAKER_01]: Could I jump in here? 3:32 [SPEAKER_01]: And I'm so glad that in a way I devil's advocated myself, because [SPEAKER_01]: The argument behind disorder and why Putin is a disorder, is that unlike Stalin, he has no order that he's trying to promote. 3:45 [SPEAKER_01]: Stalin had a book and economic ideology and a system that Cuba or Zayir or Angola could unwrap. 3:54 [SPEAKER_01]: So I completely agree, continue. 3:56 [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, so in that context, again, it's based around as it were what works, and above all, though, clearly, that's not necessarily what works for ordinary Russians, it's not necessarily what works for Russia, it's what works for Putin and his mates, and what gives him the best chance of a staying in power in an office. 4:15 [SPEAKER_00]: and in general survival, but also for the moment the best chance of beating Ukraine. 4:22 [SPEAKER_00]: And remember, for him beating Ukraine also means beating facing down the whole of the Western Alliance, sort of the very least Europe, because he sees this as a proxy war. 4:31 [SPEAKER_00]: With! 4:32 [SPEAKER_00]: some rightness on his side, but nonetheless it's a lot more complex than that. 4:36 [SPEAKER_00]: Anyway, all that preamble to one side, essentially what Wall Putinism has meant is that an existing system which was in many ways frankly dominated by marketing on economics, and also a certain... 4:51 [SPEAKER_00]: a certain well, I wouldn't say sort of pleading to, but in acceptance of the value of law, both internationally as well as nationally, with the caveat that boys take second place to put in their own personal interests. 5:04 [SPEAKER_00]: and a certain sense that, although this was never a democracy, there was space for civil society and public initiative and such, like, so much of that's been squeezed out, and it's all about the kind of immediate expedient responses to a crisis, which is why I drew the parallel with what was war communism, which is essentially when you had the Bolsheviks come to power in 1917, with an ideology that was in many ways tremendously humane. 5:30 [SPEAKER_00]: believed it was creating a world where there will be no exploitation and no coercion and so forth. 5:36 [SPEAKER_00]: Then found itself in it in a civil war in which you ended up becoming the most vicious or authoritarian monolith that one could possibly imagine. 5:44 [SPEAKER_00]: So essentially, what Putinism is about is not as it were abandoning a theoretical commitment to, for example, the market economy. 5:54 [SPEAKER_00]: But in practice, increasingly, a bit here and bit there bringing more and more of the economy under the control of the other state or the cronies of Putin. 6:03 [SPEAKER_00]: and likewise politically, it's about squeezing out all the inconvenient aspects of public participation. 6:10 [SPEAKER_00]: So if you want to have a protest saying why we should be hammering the Ukrainians and why we should be supporting the special military operation, go right ahead. 6:17 [SPEAKER_00]: You want to have something that is even faintly critical. 6:20 [SPEAKER_00]: I'm not even saying anti-putin, but even just faintly critical aspects of policy. 6:24 [SPEAKER_00]: then you're going to have real trouble. 6:26 [SPEAKER_00]: So again, it's this increasing militarization, increasing sense that well as as the old Soviet slogan went, everything for the front. 6:36 [SPEAKER_00]: And that is after all the essence of Mussolini-esque fascism. 6:41 [SPEAKER_00]: I use the F word cautiously because then people think narcissism and everything else and you know Putin is not Mussolini and all these other caveats apply. 6:48 [SPEAKER_00]: But that that sense for when it comes down to it the state is really an adjunct 6:54 [SPEAKER_01]: If we're going back to this war putonism as you've cast it, staying at this 30,000 foot level, 7:01 [SPEAKER_01]: He's just keen on disordering his external opponents and then cowing his internal ones so that no one can gang up on him, that the opposition, whether it's the Navalny's or, you know, we had Evgenia Caramosa on this show. 7:18 [SPEAKER_01]: Her husband, Vladimir Caramosa, that there can never be a unifying figure or unifying opposition ideology and that the Western or other [SPEAKER_01]: opponents can never, you know, work together. 7:31 [SPEAKER_01]: Is that a key part of war putinism? 7:34 [SPEAKER_00]: It is. 7:35 [SPEAKER_00]: It is. 7:35 [SPEAKER_00]: Because remember, one of the key things driving Putin is insecurity. 7:39 [SPEAKER_00]: You know, for all the match of show, this is a very insecure figure with a very insecure regime. 7:44 [SPEAKER_00]: And this sense precisely of other people's unity as a dangerous. 7:49 [SPEAKER_00]: You mentioned an extent of alming. 7:52 [SPEAKER_00]: tremendously effective political operator, but the key thing what made him really dangerous was that he wasn't just another middle-class metropolitan muskabite appealing to a similar liberal base. 8:06 [SPEAKER_00]: He was actually trying to reach out and getting touch and I called it a coalition of the fed up, you know all sorts of different communities all around the country. 8:14 [SPEAKER_00]: who didn't have any necessarily coherent vision for a future Russia, but they all had their complaints, their criticism, to particularly the common theme was corruption, as being the sort of black thread that ties all of this together. 8:27 [SPEAKER_00]: And because Navalny was beginning to actually create a national machine and a national base, that I think is why he absolutely had to go. 8:35 [SPEAKER_00]: He couldn't just simply be dealt with by putting him in prison 8:39 [SPEAKER_00]: And likewise, if you look internationally, I mean, it is clear that a central driving force behind so much of Russian foreign policy, and it's a foreign policy that stretches from level of speeches at the United Nations General Assembly, all the way through to the dark arts of sabotage and disinformation. 8:58 [SPEAKER_00]: And so forth, I mean, from the Russians point of view, this is all a spectrum that leads all the way, frankly, to warfare, outright warfare. 9:05 [SPEAKER_00]: It is precisely this 9:09 [SPEAKER_00]: the enemy. 9:10 [SPEAKER_00]: And we are the enemy, from that perspective, individually, for example, in no European country would be considered to be a threat to the Russian Federation, but collectively Europe, European community, plus the UK, is clearly threatening because they've able to continue to support and basically keep the Ukraine more going. 9:28 [SPEAKER_00]: So now, for all of these reasons, it is unity, that is the threat. 9:33 [SPEAKER_01]: 100%. 9:33 [SPEAKER_01]: I want to draw out two themes from what you've said there. 9:36 [SPEAKER_01]: The one is to use Nadov Safran's famous phrase, the endless quest for security. 9:42 [SPEAKER_01]: He was talking about Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and 80s and saying literally everything that they do, whether it's about oil, price, or military purchases, or whatever, is to stay in power. 9:53 [SPEAKER_01]: It's only about staying in power. 9:54 [SPEAKER_01]: And although they seem to be flush with cash, [SPEAKER_01]: They're just terrified of losing power. 9:59 [SPEAKER_01]: And I think whether it's Putin at a 24 table, as you've always mocked or showing him shirtless on horseback or scoring six goals at a hockey game in his 70s, it's because he's fundamentally insecure. 10:15 [SPEAKER_01]: He needs to be so much hope because he's insecure. 10:16 [SPEAKER_01]: And I wanna connect this back to disordering, I think that that is actually what unites [SPEAKER_01]: what I call the opopilism of Trump or Bon Putin, Bolsonaro, not that they always succeed, but that they're just trying to stay empowered. 10:34 [SPEAKER_01]: That that's the ideology of it. 10:37 [SPEAKER_01]: And then you pointed out, which is that even Britain having cross-party consensus about supporting Ukraine is not sufficient. 10:48 [SPEAKER_01]: It doesn't move the needle. 10:49 [SPEAKER_01]: It's only if the Europeans would be completely united [SPEAKER_01]: defense procurement and long-term strategic thinking together. 10:57 [SPEAKER_01]: Would it be unfair to say that Russia has been extremely instrumental in the last decade and a half in making sure that there isn't greater European unity on a range of issues? 11:09 [SPEAKER_00]: I think it's tricky to say instrumental because at the key point is, Russia doesn't have the capacity to change people's minds. 11:16 [SPEAKER_00]: There are no Jedi in mind tricks to be deployed here. 11:18 [SPEAKER_00]: What they have and what they're very good at unfortunately is the capacity to identify a whole variety of the four blinds which are inevitable within and between democracies anyway. 11:30 [SPEAKER_00]: and frankly, had been getting more and more visible for a whole variety of reasons, ranging from the fact that our democratic structures are in many ways still rooted in the 19th century in certain notions about class solidarity and the like. 11:43 [SPEAKER_00]: All the way through to the fact of the changing dynamics of power and economic and political in the world. 11:50 [SPEAKER_00]: All of this means that this is anyway, even of the ideal circumstances would have been a fairly disordered world. 11:57 [SPEAKER_00]: But then, around come the Russians, not unique, but, you know, particularly the Russians, with their largely sort of informational crowbar, and identify those fault lines and do everything they can to price them open, and in particular, taking advantage of the fact that they are essentially a non-ideological state, it's not like the Communist Party. 12:16 [SPEAKER_00]: which back in Soviet days did find some degree of constraints over which lines it could adopt, which narratives it could present. 12:25 [SPEAKER_00]: The thing about Putin's Russia is that it's a raw-shak ink block test of a country. 12:30 [SPEAKER_00]: It can be all things to all people. 12:32 [SPEAKER_00]: It can support the NRA and Black Lives Matter. 12:36 [SPEAKER_00]: It can support people who want their countries to break apart. 12:40 [SPEAKER_00]: Now, most recently, it was level of sort of being quite encouraging me about the Celtic nations rising up against English rule. 12:48 [SPEAKER_00]: And it can also talk to nationalist states who want to make sure that they keep their countries together. 12:54 [SPEAKER_00]: So, you know, essentially, they are doing their best to magnify the existing discontents that we would see in the world. 13:05 [SPEAKER_01]: Now, given that they are so good at this disordering, what would you assess as the overall positionality towards the American midterms and the struggles of [SPEAKER_01]: post-Trumpian neo-populism. 13:22 [SPEAKER_01]: We're in an inflection point and yes, I'm American. 13:25 [SPEAKER_01]: So I'm going to give a little bit more emphasis to what's happening in the U.S. 13:28 [SPEAKER_01]: But I think these midterms are really important, right? 13:32 [SPEAKER_01]: If they're rigged, if the Democrats don't take back the house, if the [SPEAKER_01]: DSA can that it's meaning Abdel Saeed and Mamdanay and others are dominant. 13:43 [SPEAKER_01]: And then this causes a rift within the Democratic Party. 13:46 [SPEAKER_01]: I think the goose is cooked, in other words, that that really will allow Russia to outlast the West. 13:52 [SPEAKER_01]: So I just wanted to ask you, as they're doing all of that, are they moving the need of 1% 5% 10% there's no way to know how do you analyze that? 14:04 [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I mean, in terms of the needle, it's which needle. 14:07 [SPEAKER_00]: Now, I think the Russians have learned they learn some years ago that their capacity to actually influence the outcomes of votes is often very, very limited. 14:15 [SPEAKER_00]: And indeed, it can be deeply counterproductive. 14:18 [SPEAKER_00]: What they do do is realize that elections are playtime for them, because elections naturally magnify all those internal crises and disagreements. 14:34 [SPEAKER_00]: through working out plans when the presidential administration in Moscow or the Lubyanka or whatever. 14:41 [SPEAKER_00]: I would be delighted because it this looks like it's going to be an ugly midterm. 14:46 [SPEAKER_00]: Not just in terms of the run-up to the elections, but also the recriminations, the questioning of the results, the claims of rigging and so forth afterwards. 14:55 [SPEAKER_00]: and the joy from this alternate me who's sitting in Moscow is exactly that you don't actually have to create that, you just simply have it there that you can then magnify and you can pick and choose, it is a positive buffet of disinformation topics and disordering narratives for you to pick up from and because I think from the point of view of Trump, 15:19 [SPEAKER_00]: Right from the beginning of when Trump was re-elected, one of the key lines that's coming out to the Russian people from their own experts in their own government was Trump is not our friend. 15:29 [SPEAKER_00]: He may well be very helpful and useful in a variety of ways, but he has his own interests, and Trump can be useful today in dangerous tomorrow. 15:36 [SPEAKER_00]: So there's always been a certain caution about it, but there's also been a growing sense of frustration, because they had hoped that Trump would be the weapon that they used to essentially impose an ugly piece on Ukraine. 15:48 [SPEAKER_00]: but he never did, and therefore they're looking to, you know, a presenting in a different light. 15:55 [SPEAKER_01]: So we've mentioned elections, and people, of course, are not generally going to be that interested in. 16:01 [SPEAKER_01]: Russian elections. 16:02 [SPEAKER_01]: So we're going to speak about both elections and the ever-growing, rampaging, bear population to keep things a little bit more exciting. 16:10 [SPEAKER_01]: Keep the listeners on their toes. 16:12 [SPEAKER_01]: So United Russia has just emerged from the recent Duma elections with 349 out of 450 seats. 16:21 [SPEAKER_01]: Obviously this is a supermajority and it's their biggest share ever. 16:26 [SPEAKER_01]: you describe the party's bare mascot as looking rather fat and smug. 16:32 [SPEAKER_01]: So firstly, tell the listeners very, very concisely, what were these Duma elections? 16:38 [SPEAKER_01]: Russia, Sam, democracy, doesn't matter that there are elections, what's the role of political parties and what transpired in these Duma elections? 16:47 [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, this may be changing over time, but the historically speaking, the way that Putin's system has worked has been to maintain legitimacy by looking like a proper democratic political system. 16:59 [SPEAKER_00]: So we have a parliament, we have regular elections, we have what are notionally opposition parties that the communists, the liberal Democrats who are deeply a liberal and an anti-democratic, and so forth. 17:11 [SPEAKER_00]: In practice though, this is all just theatre. 17:17 [SPEAKER_00]: of pluralism and to give Russians that sense of [SPEAKER_00]: This ratio you're being legitimate. 17:23 [SPEAKER_00]: So it's not just simply being maintained by the secret police and the riot police and so forth. 17:28 [SPEAKER_00]: That sense that it is a genuine government of the people. 17:32 [SPEAKER_00]: And that's why these elections matter because it means that there always has to be the right result. 17:37 [SPEAKER_00]: And obviously the state will read the results, but they need to try and keep it looking plausible. 17:42 [SPEAKER_00]: This is not why it's not like one of these dictatorial states, like North Korea with it's 100% voting for the Democratic Party. 17:51 [SPEAKER_00]: they have to make it look real and it's getting to be more and more of a struggle and they're having to rig more and more blatantly and the danger is the more you rig the more people will wake up to that thing hang on a minute all of my friends say they're going to vote for someone else they're not vote at all and suddenly we've been told that in our precinct there was you know 80% turnout and they all said that Putin was lovely at that point you basically run the risk 18:21 [SPEAKER_01]: And this leads to the question, what does the actual result and their need for that rigging tell us about Russian society? 18:29 [SPEAKER_00]: It tells us that Russians are not very happy. 18:31 [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, the official results was 60% turn out, 58% for Putin's United Russia party. 18:38 [SPEAKER_00]: Now, people who much, much more sort of mathematically capable than me have crunched the numbers, and actually suggest that it looks more like as if the actual turnout was 40%. 18:48 [SPEAKER_00]: which given the amount of pressure to try and get people to vote, employers busting their employees for the polling stations, and so forth, is a low result, even though, obviously, by genuine Democratic standards, 40% isn't too bad. 19:00 [SPEAKER_00]: But more to point, probably United Russia only got 37% of the vote. 19:05 [SPEAKER_00]: So even though they've now been awarded the Super Majority in Parliament, they clearly do not have that kind of mass support. 19:11 [SPEAKER_00]: So look, we're not talking about a situation in which Russians are about to come out onto the streets and protests, because this is still a thuggish police state. 19:18 [SPEAKER_00]: But what it does demonstrate is precisely that Russians are tired. 19:21 [SPEAKER_00]: They're probably tired of Putin, they're certainly tired of the war, and if they can't resist openly and actively because it's so dangerous, they can at least kind of resist internally. 19:33 [SPEAKER_00]: Just as they did in late Soviet times, where you just simply switch off and essentially just do your own thing, you look after yourself and you're family and such like, and think of politics as something like the weather. 19:45 [SPEAKER_00]: You can't change it, you can just endure it. 19:48 [SPEAKER_01]: United Russia's logo is a bear, and amazingly, there are actually more real bears wandering around Russia these days, and you describe this in your recent episode of in Moscow's shadows that we're going to have a link in the show notes to that. 20:04 [SPEAKER_01]: And of course, Putinism is itself increasingly bearish. 20:08 [SPEAKER_01]: Mark, have we reached peak bear? 20:13 [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, I mean, this is a difficult thing, because it's such a cliche, the bear and Russia, but it works like so many cliches because there's enough truth in it. 20:23 [SPEAKER_00]: And I think, yes, we've got a situation in which at the moment bears are increasingly wondering into settlements, because there's more bears than they were before, there's less hunting, and also it's been a bad year for the usual food supplies. 20:38 [SPEAKER_00]: And that has meant, frankly, a lot more Russians are getting killed by bears. 20:42 [SPEAKER_00]: And in that context, I mean, if one, then admittedly, this is just kind of... 20:47 [SPEAKER_00]: tenuously drawing out the analogy. 20:50 [SPEAKER_00]: But I mean, it is precisely because of a combination of poor economic circumstances, which in this case is the acorn economy, shall we say. 20:58 [SPEAKER_00]: But also bad decisions made by the Russian state in terms of land use and croaching on territories which which the bears used to have and so more is eliminating the court on sanitaire that get people away from bears. 21:11 [SPEAKER_00]: And also just [SPEAKER_00]: climate change, which again is moving bare populations and bad luck. 21:17 [SPEAKER_00]: And the thing that strikes me is if we want to draw the power out with with with with putonism is exactly that on the one hand the bear is meant to be the symbol of Russia and most Russians think of them bears as being sort of powerful, protective, playful creatures rather than just in place are 21:35 [SPEAKER_00]: but at the same time, it's a combination of of missteps, each of which seem to make sense at the time. 21:43 [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, well, let's build this little bit of village out there. 21:46 [SPEAKER_00]: Let's do some more forestation there. 21:49 [SPEAKER_00]: Let's stop the ghastly trade in Bearclaws and Bear biol going to China for folk medicines and so forth, you know, each of these decisions seem to make sense in its own terms. 22:00 [SPEAKER_00]: But it's when you put it together and add just simple bad luck. 22:04 [SPEAKER_00]: that suddenly things start to get to be a problem. 22:07 [SPEAKER_00]: And I think that's often the way with Putinism. 22:10 [SPEAKER_01]: I think it's the way with many political systems that are failing to process diverse inputs into technocratic, expert-mediated solutions. 22:20 [SPEAKER_01]: I'll give the example of deer where I'm from a New Jersey. 22:24 [SPEAKER_01]: When I was a kid, there were no deer in Central New Jersey. 22:28 [SPEAKER_01]: There were deer in Pennsylvania and in really the Western New Jersey hills. 22:35 [SPEAKER_01]: There weren't deer in the suburbs of New York City. 22:38 [SPEAKER_01]: Why would there be? 22:39 [SPEAKER_01]: But what do you know? 22:40 [SPEAKER_01]: If you build a million homes where the deer used to live, you chop down all the forests and do the climate change and a million things they come down from Canada and Vermont. 22:51 [SPEAKER_01]: The deer graze on my backyard, there are 20 or more deer that live in my backyard in mid-Touch and New Jersey, and this has been the case for 15 years. 22:59 [SPEAKER_01]: And what is the implication of this is Lyme disease, and very tragically, a super close friend of mine and Manhattan, [SPEAKER_01]: She got Lyme disease recently and it's not like you know what's happening. 23:12 [SPEAKER_01]: It's like so ill that she's in the ER and getting infusions and whatever. 23:16 [SPEAKER_01]: So I think that rampaging bears might be assigned that the disorderly apocalypse is nigh, just as herds of deer colonizing my house in New Jersey wasn't exactly a great indicator that everything was right with the world. 23:31 [SPEAKER_01]: So please join us after the break. 23:36 [SPEAKER_01]: two very important questions can Russia actually afford this war and then is kleptocracy a system or does it eat itself? 24:01 [SPEAKER_01]: We're back, and man, I hope that you, the mega-orderers are enjoying this episode as much as I am. 24:08 [SPEAKER_01]: I'm super thrilled to be learning from Mark Galiade, the host of Inmaskos Shadows. 24:16 [SPEAKER_01]: So I promise the listeners that we would dive deeper into the Russian economy, and you are the person who I would love to help explain these things. 24:26 [SPEAKER_01]: to our listeners. 24:27 [SPEAKER_01]: Let's get beneath the headline GDP numbers because we know that the Russians manipulate them. 24:32 [SPEAKER_01]: We know that the rubble can go up and down and all of that. 24:37 [SPEAKER_01]: So there's spending about 25% of their economy or GDP on the war. 24:41 [SPEAKER_01]: Is that healthy? 24:42 [SPEAKER_01]: Does that work? 24:44 [SPEAKER_00]: No, I mean, it's the short answer, but I'm actually like a slightly more expansive one. 24:48 [SPEAKER_00]: Look, and the thing is, there are inevitably certain positive outcomes as a result for certain Russians. 24:56 [SPEAKER_00]: If you work in the defense industrial complex, if you're a factory worker, they're given there is a labor shortage, not least, because there's either fact that what at a half million Russians have been killed or seriously wounded in Ukraine. 25:07 [SPEAKER_00]: then you see your salary go, I'll con such like, no, but broadly speaking, this is absolutely not a good thing for the economy, because what's happening is in effect, Russia is devouring its own muscle mass to keep itself going, because it can't borrow on the international markets, so even when the state borrows it's borrowing from Russian financial institutions. 25:28 [SPEAKER_00]: What about from China? 25:30 [SPEAKER_00]: The Chinese financial system is not looking to get itself embroiled with the Russian. 25:34 [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, we've actually seen Chinese banks detach themselves from their own counterparts. 25:40 [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, again, because, again, from their point of view, the Russians are pretty radioactive in this context. 25:46 [SPEAKER_00]: And so, although there's parts of the Chinese and Indian economies, which are more or less cut themselves apart, so that they can continue to work with the Russians without the fear of sanctions, secondary sanctions. 25:58 [SPEAKER_00]: Broadly speaking, the Chinese financial system is not about to be locked away from the West, just simply so that it can continue to do business with Russia. 26:07 [SPEAKER_00]: There is a very clear link limit to how the Chinese are willing to put themselves out for the Russians. 26:17 [SPEAKER_00]: So in that context, can the Russian government continue to spend on the war in Ukraine at this level? 26:26 [SPEAKER_00]: because like all authoritarian regimes, it can essentially transfer the costs to the public, to smaller businesses, and indeed sometimes to larger businesses. 26:37 [SPEAKER_00]: You know, if you are a rich Russian these days, you know, gone of the days of the oligarchs who could tell the crediting what to do. 26:43 [SPEAKER_00]: Now, you basically know that you remain rich and free, so long as Putin is happy to let you. 26:49 [SPEAKER_00]: So, you know, we're not gonna be expecting any major pushback if you start to levies that are windfall taxes 26:57 [SPEAKER_00]: But in the longer term, first of all, the scarring on the system is tremendous, I mean Putin is really burning Russia's future in the name of his current war. 27:09 [SPEAKER_01]: And, and geographically as well, I mean, just the mere fact that the population has been, you know, cratering in the last 30 years is something that I'll come back to later, but if you have all these reproductive age men that are off in the meat grinder and then women who just run abroad to, you know, get married and live lives in the West because of how repressive the country is. 27:36 [SPEAKER_01]: who's going to have babies, what's the next generation going to be? 27:40 [SPEAKER_00]: True, I mean, and there's also just the broader issue which, you know, pretty much every Western country has is actually that with prosperity and comfort on the whole child bearing go goes down unless you're a bear. 27:53 [SPEAKER_00]: So I mean, in that context, I mean, this is something that [SPEAKER_00]: You're getting an increasing, a strand of opinion emerging in Russia that this war cannot be allowed to go on long term. 28:05 [SPEAKER_01]: Really? 28:06 [SPEAKER_00]: But it either, yeah, absolutely. 28:08 [SPEAKER_00]: And the interesting thing is that this is a debate that was taking place behind closed doors until about a year ago. 28:14 [SPEAKER_00]: And now it's beginning to be cautiously, I have to stress, play it out in expert commentary and newspaper accounts. 28:20 [SPEAKER_00]: And that means that Putin must have given the green light to it. 28:23 [SPEAKER_00]: There is actually quite a strong sense that 2027 is the year in which the war has to be if not brought to an end, but certainly brought to a less intense stage, because it's actually the cost to great. 28:36 [SPEAKER_01]: Am I correct then in saying that you and Hannah noticed slightly disagree because what she writes in her book and what she said in the disorder podcast is that 28:46 [SPEAKER_01]: The only way Putin can defeat Ukraine in the West is by outlasting Western Resolve and that he genuinely thinks for a range of ideological and emotional reasons that he can outlast us. 28:59 [SPEAKER_00]: In a way, there's two wars that are being conflated there. 29:02 [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, I think in terms of if you're talking about the actual some shooting war in Ukraine, [SPEAKER_00]: there is a sense of the cost to great. 29:09 [SPEAKER_00]: Now if he can't get a piece on the terms that he wants, what he can do because after all the aggressor unfortunately has the initiative here. 29:16 [SPEAKER_00]: He can slightly scale down combat operations. 29:19 [SPEAKER_00]: So that Ukraine is still being a sale of and the missiles and the drones are still hammering Ukrainian cities, but he's not throwing so many troops into the meat grinder. 29:28 [SPEAKER_00]: they're more or less awaiting their time, pure offensive. 29:32 [SPEAKER_00]: So again, it's a question of, he can modulate it down to a different kind of war. 29:38 [SPEAKER_00]: But of course, there's also this political war that's going on with the West. 29:42 [SPEAKER_00]: And this is the thing. 29:42 [SPEAKER_00]: So even if... 29:44 [SPEAKER_00]: and wouldn't it be wonderful out of the case? 29:46 [SPEAKER_00]: Even if there is a peace in Ukraine next year and the guns fall silent there, Putin will still be at war. 29:53 [SPEAKER_00]: I think one other aspect of war communism is now I think he's locked into a need to have an external enemy. 30:00 [SPEAKER_00]: It doesn't mean to say he needs to have shooting going on. 30:03 [SPEAKER_00]: but he needs to have an enemy that can justify all of his repressive measures, that can explain why anyone who speaks against him is not just a dissident, but is actually a traitor. 30:15 [SPEAKER_00]: And, you know, in the process, the west or bubble Europe will be that enemy. 30:21 [SPEAKER_01]: And I think that we see a system whereby Netanyahu and the Iranian Ayatollas are exactly the same. 30:27 [SPEAKER_01]: They need to have an external enemy now to stay in power and Netanyahu wants the war to continue by Hooker Crook. 30:35 [SPEAKER_01]: And now that the Ayatollas are essentially run by the IRGC, [SPEAKER_01]: they need some kind of war to continue. 30:41 [SPEAKER_01]: So that's a really interesting way of putting it. 30:45 [SPEAKER_01]: I want to return to this economic theme. 30:47 [SPEAKER_01]: How important is tax evasion, the shadow economy, and simple corruption in limiting the criminal disability to extract resources from Russian society? 30:57 [SPEAKER_01]: In other words, it's Russia's so disordering and so corrupt that it can't even disorder effectively because it's been eating all its own muscle mass. 31:07 [SPEAKER_00]: The trouble is that disordering is actually relatively cost-effective. 31:12 [SPEAKER_00]: You don't need that much money. 31:14 [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, you know, for a few thousand euros, you can hire some thug off a backstreet in Europe to go and fire bomb a factory, or you can provide a little bit of extra support for some incredibly toxic and subversive YouTuber who's beaming out of his mother's basement. 31:32 [SPEAKER_00]: So, in that respect, you actually, you know, full-scale wars are expensive, disordering sort of conflicts actually are often quite cheap. 31:39 [SPEAKER_00]: But yeah, I mean, we see that issues to do with corruption in Bezledant and sort of associated crimes within Russia are getting worse once again. 31:49 [SPEAKER_00]: In part, precisely because there is a little bit of a fantasy of a clear feel. 31:53 [SPEAKER_00]: People think that, although they don't imagine it's going to happen in me imminently, but a sense that this cannot go on. 32:00 [SPEAKER_00]: So whereas once upon a time people might think, well, I will, I will in bezel at a moderate level, because I plan to in bezel long term. 32:08 [SPEAKER_00]: Now they're thinking, you know, cash out and get out as quick as you can, make whatever you can. 32:13 [SPEAKER_00]: So I think this is a real sign of problems within the system. 32:16 [SPEAKER_01]: This is exactly what's happened in Libya, by the way. 32:19 [SPEAKER_01]: So in the Kadafi period, before what we call the datan, and in other words, the economic reforms of 2003 to 2010 before the regime collapsed, they didn't want to do so much corruption and cannibalism that the Kadafi regime would fall apart. 32:35 [SPEAKER_01]: Because it was a stable system. 32:36 [SPEAKER_01]: He was in power for four decades. 32:40 [SPEAKER_01]: Now, post Kadafi, [SPEAKER_01]: with the on-again off-again hot civil war and the bifurcation of institutions, as soon as the oil price goes up and you can through letters of credit fraud and more subsidies and whatever, you know, just mint dollars, they just do it. 33:00 [SPEAKER_01]: Even though the future is being completely destroyed of the Libyan state, because people think the Prime Minister may be out in a second, the malicious may take over my house. 33:10 [SPEAKER_01]: you got to make a well-designed shots and this is very tragic for these resource extraction societies because it may be that in 20 years those resources are not worth that much and the human capital development and infrastructure development that Russia or Libya could have gotten, you know, that's not going to be able to be done in 30 years time. 33:29 [SPEAKER_01]: You agree? 33:30 [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, and that's a really interesting parallel actually, because, again, as you say, it's just simply that sense of insecurity, breed certain behaviors, which ironically feed the insecurity. 33:43 [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, they get a feedback loop. 33:44 [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, exactly. 33:45 [SPEAKER_00]: And so, look, I mean, again, I really would want to stress that I'm not for a moment saying that this system is going to collapse, or certainly not, not collapse within the sort of foreseeable future. 33:55 [SPEAKER_00]: But it's precisely... 33:57 [SPEAKER_00]: the failure of Putin to maintain that sense of inevitability in a way that earlier Putin iteration, the show you say, actually was quite successful in creating system in which everyone could be corrupt but there was that sense of a moral economy that you knew sort of how much you had to be corrupt and you had to be 34:19 [SPEAKER_00]: The verse of this may sound honestly corrupt. 34:22 [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, that's exactly the same as in Cadafi's Libya. 34:24 [SPEAKER_01]: I just want to make literally you could be describing the way in which the debibas took money from Odak or Baghdad al Mahmoudi from the oil sector. 34:36 [SPEAKER_01]: You need it to be quote unquote honestly corrupt. 34:39 [SPEAKER_01]: And if you went beyond the limits, the old man threw you in prison for three weeks, took away your prime minister job, and then you got rotated back in and you could be prime minister in two years. 34:49 [SPEAKER_01]: That's all gone because when you have the rule of the militias, as you do now, it's a free for all. 34:56 [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, obviously we don't have rule of militias in Russia, but instead you increasingly have, I say, the rule of the security apparatus. 35:04 [SPEAKER_00]: You're having more and more people who are finding their businesses being essentially expropriated, raiding is the Russian term for it. 35:10 [SPEAKER_00]: Someone comes along with a court order that you have no idea about that somehow says that you had some huge unpaid debt and this is why your property is now. 35:19 [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, yeah, some of the assets. 35:21 [SPEAKER_01]: This is a great transition to gemis and firestone because when he talks about having a 35:35 [SPEAKER_01]: He gets it how corruption in Russia works on the rule of lies. 35:39 [SPEAKER_01]: It's not just the rule of force. 35:41 [SPEAKER_01]: So I think that's an excellent pivot for us to discuss kleptocracy as a system. 35:46 [SPEAKER_01]: Russians are highly educated people. 35:48 [SPEAKER_01]: They're really literate in a way. 35:49 [SPEAKER_01]: They might be more literate than we are here in the West. 35:52 [SPEAKER_01]: So... 35:54 [SPEAKER_01]: looking at the Magnetski tax fraud and the nature of how institutions which are not independent are still used as institutions in Russia is club-tocracy, a system which is eating itself. 36:06 [SPEAKER_00]: It is and this is why in the long term democracy doesn't seem to work. 36:10 [SPEAKER_00]: You could have periods of apparent stability as one did in the early putting years, but in part that was because of the revolution to what had happened in the 1990s which was truly chaotic [SPEAKER_00]: ridiculously disordered. 36:26 [SPEAKER_00]: But also, frankly, because there was enough money to go round, you know, when the cake is expanding and the only question is how much bigger a slice do you get? 36:35 [SPEAKER_00]: Everyone can work together. 36:37 [SPEAKER_00]: It's when the cake is shrinking. 36:39 [SPEAKER_00]: that people get all the more violent and vicious in their struggles because they want to keep their slice to the same size. 36:45 [SPEAKER_00]: But I think if I think of Russia as a kleptocracy, I've often felt that in a way there are three Russia's. 36:49 [SPEAKER_00]: There's this enormous Russia, a lot of Russia works as you'd expect it to work. 36:53 [SPEAKER_00]: There are institutions and ministries and you take a court case and the court will resolve based on the law and such like, you know, for most ordinary Russians, things do still work. 37:04 [SPEAKER_00]: above that though you have pleptocratic Russia, you know again where where basically money is used to distort all the processes. 37:11 [SPEAKER_00]: But the point is above that you have caught Russia, this is a small circle of people who have put in favor. 37:17 [SPEAKER_00]: And that is the ultimate currency and power. 37:20 [SPEAKER_00]: And in a way, each has to bend to the ones above them. 37:23 [SPEAKER_00]: So ordinary Russia works fine until someone comes along who's got the right roof, he's willing to pay, and then suddenly the courts won't listen to you and police won't protect you and whatever else. 37:35 [SPEAKER_00]: And likewise, the Cleptocrats, they're riding high. 37:38 [SPEAKER_00]: Until that day that they run up against someone who is the first cousin of [SPEAKER_00]: Putin's closest crony, and all of a sudden they find that their money actually doesn't mean anything when the tax authorities are coming kicking down their door. 37:52 [SPEAKER_00]: And I think in that context, the issue is that kleptocracy, it had its own norms and rules and kind of worked in its own way, because people A, as I say, had a sense that this was long term, and therefore you would rather bribe or in bezel rather a little bit over a long period. 38:11 [SPEAKER_00]: but also because as it were the court didn't interfere too much. 38:16 [SPEAKER_00]: What we're now getting is increasingly as as a late-puternism is so much more dominated by the struggles between his various cronies in part precisely because they want to cash in while they can, the sense that the old man might not be around forever. 38:30 [SPEAKER_00]: And that is anyway buckling the system from above. 38:34 [SPEAKER_01]: I think this is a super important point and it's something that Neopopilism shares in 38:41 [SPEAKER_01]: because in the U.S. Whitcoff hates bullows, and the various sons of Whitcoff and the sons of Trump and others compete because if I'm doing a bit coin rugpole, and Jared is also getting money from the Emirates and doing a bit coin rugpole, the system of extreme corruption causes a competition. 39:04 [SPEAKER_01]: within it. 39:05 [SPEAKER_01]: In other words, we can even see that it's not just ideology that puts Rubio against vance against Whitkoff against Jared. 39:15 [SPEAKER_01]: It's the structural interests that [SPEAKER_01]: Hey, I want to be the one who's the closest to Peter Teele. 39:21 [SPEAKER_01]: I want my kids to do this rugploss. 39:24 [SPEAKER_01]: So maybe that's a problem with an authoritarian corrupt system. 39:29 [SPEAKER_01]: In general, is that it creates incentive structures, which can't keep together a coalition. 39:35 [SPEAKER_00]: It also depends entirely on just how smart and active the figure of the centuries. 39:41 [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, actually again, if one looks at early Putinism, earlier Putinism, rather, [SPEAKER_00]: He was actually very good at this. 39:47 [SPEAKER_00]: He was very good at playing the games of divide and rule. 39:51 [SPEAKER_00]: At not only ensuring no one got to be too powerful, but also at stepping in when conflicts looked as if they were going to become too disruptive. 40:00 [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, this was arguably that the one good thing he did, and I'm saying good in a systemic rather moral sense. 40:07 [SPEAKER_00]: Um, you know, but what's happened is especially since COVID and I think again, when the history is written it'll be fascinating to actually try to work out how much of this can come down to what happened to Putin under COVID when he's or isolated himself from his own country. 40:21 [SPEAKER_00]: But the point is that even before then, but especially after that, Putin has become less and less willing to get involved and less capable of getting involved. 40:31 [SPEAKER_00]: And this is why even if you think of the Wagner mutiny, when actually, you know, you have forces rolling down the motorway towards Moscow, even then that was actually just simply because of an intra-elite competition between you've got the progression of Wagner and Minister of Defense Shogu with this being a sort of last-age effort to try and enlist Putin's support. 40:52 [SPEAKER_00]: People before then have been time and time again for months, been warning Putin. 40:57 [SPEAKER_00]: that this precaution should you rivalry is getting dangerous, it's getting out of control, and you're the only person who can step in. 41:04 [SPEAKER_00]: Putin's created a system in which he's the only decider. 41:07 [SPEAKER_00]: But nowadays, he doesn't tend to decide, he decides late, or he decides badly. 41:13 [SPEAKER_00]: So this is it, kleptocracies are inherently unstable forces. 41:19 [SPEAKER_00]: They need that constant course correction to keep them to some degree of stability. 41:24 [SPEAKER_00]: And ultimately, no one is going to be able to stay on their game for that long. 41:30 [SPEAKER_01]: So, we have covered so much ground and it's been so fun and amusing. 41:35 [SPEAKER_01]: I hope you will join me after the break as we order the disorder. 41:57 [SPEAKER_01]: Okay, now you're back with me, Jason Pack, and Mark Galliotti, the host of Inmaskow's Shadows. 42:08 [SPEAKER_01]: He and I are going to order the disorder, but before we do so, allow me to plug you for the mega-orderer's club. 42:16 [SPEAKER_01]: That is where you sign up at [SPEAKER_01]: disorder show dot com forward slash club or by following the link in the show notes and you join at the various tiers that we have and you get extra bonus content, ed free listening, early release episodes. 42:34 [SPEAKER_01]: And in this instance, you will be getting a full 10 to 15 minutes of bonus content with 42:45 [SPEAKER_01]: more questions from listeners like can Ukraine actually win, and then some more joky joky about Russia's bears. 42:54 [SPEAKER_01]: But Mark, returning to the heart of the matter, Paul Rivendillo, on No Mutong. 43:01 [SPEAKER_01]: We have to order the disorder. 43:03 [SPEAKER_01]: Let us go into the lightning round. 43:06 [SPEAKER_01]: I spoke with Hannah Notay 10 days ago and she thinks that Putin may actually be able to outlast the West. 43:16 [SPEAKER_01]: What does he need to remain standing until Western resolve fractures? 43:23 [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, essentially what he needs is, well, first of all, no black swans, because I think the trouble is, there's much less resilience left within the Russian system than at the never before. 43:33 [SPEAKER_00]: But above all, what he needs is not to have a reversal in Ukraine. 43:38 [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, so long as he's grinding along and he can claim that things are going to work out, then that's okay. 43:47 [SPEAKER_00]: If we actually start to see genuine reversals in Ukraine, then in some ways so many of the basic premises on which he sold his war to his elite, they begin to fall away. 43:57 [SPEAKER_01]: So given that, what are the real vulnerabilities in Putin's Russia that if we took them away, he couldn't outlast us, and how can Western policy makers try to hit those vulnerabilities? 44:10 [SPEAKER_00]: to be truthful, I'm not convinced that there are any such options which are politically palatable in the West. 44:17 [SPEAKER_00]: We've tried sanctions, and yes, sanctions do have an impact, absolutely, but I just don't think that we have the capacity to do much more that is not going to be self-harming and very worried, for example, about what's going to happen to Europe next year, when in theory they're not going to be buying in the main Russian gas. 44:34 [SPEAKER_00]: whether they're going to be able to actually afford to make good on that kind of promise. 44:39 [SPEAKER_00]: No, I think that we have to accept that this is a long game. 44:42 [SPEAKER_00]: That it's not that we have some magic bullet that can really seriously damage Putin's capacity. 44:48 [SPEAKER_00]: We just have to outwe're outlast him. 44:51 [SPEAKER_01]: I am not an expert on the Russia aspect the way you are. 44:56 [SPEAKER_01]: I can't even be in the same room with your expertise, but at the global level, I think that having resolved to see a different future is what makes Churchill a Martin Luther King or an FDR. 45:11 [SPEAKER_01]: It's, [SPEAKER_01]: Nelson Mandela understanding, this may not be politically palatable now, but I'm going to fight for it. 45:17 [SPEAKER_01]: And then what do you know, magically, it transformatively becomes that. 45:21 [SPEAKER_01]: So I want to invoke Sir Bill Browder who has joined us multiple times here in disorder and say, 45:28 [SPEAKER_01]: It is not that difficult to quote unquote, seize the Russian money that's frozen, not only in Europe clear, by getting the Belgians to be indemnified, but just to seize other frozen Russian assets. 45:43 [SPEAKER_01]: So isn't that an example of something which you might say, oh, it's not politically palatable right now, but if we just demanded it and took the steps to make it happen, then it would be politically palatable. 45:54 [SPEAKER_00]: I don't think so. 45:55 [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, for the simple reason that I think the Russians have essentially written off that money anyway, they're not expecting it to come up, but it can be helpful to help Ukraine win and to defeat it. 46:04 [SPEAKER_00]: It can indeed, though bear in mind, it also means that it's probably a similar amount of assets will be seized inside Russia. 46:11 [SPEAKER_00]: So actually, it's also ironically going to provide a huge stimulus to Russian economic opportunities. 46:18 [SPEAKER_00]: No, I mean, I think this is, this is what I mean, I fully appreciate that it's, it's really frustrating to have to have some smarter as like me saying more as this, there's nothing that can be done and I think the, the honest answer is we have constantly reached for what we thought we're going to be the silver bullets. 46:34 [SPEAKER_00]: whether it's going to be tank, you know, the tanks, or the F-16s, or seizing Europe, or sanctions. 46:39 [SPEAKER_00]: Mother sanctions are meant to crash the Russian economy within a matter of months or even weeks. 46:44 [SPEAKER_00]: The key thing is this, every time we do that, first of all, we have to consider the implications. 46:50 [SPEAKER_00]: But also, ironically enough, it supports Putin's narrative. 46:54 [SPEAKER_00]: Look, the current Russian system is pretty encapsulated compared with the West, but it is strongly engaged with the global South. 47:03 [SPEAKER_00]: And frankly, if we really wanted to do something, we stock China and India buying Russian energy. 47:10 [SPEAKER_00]: Exactly. 47:10 [SPEAKER_00]: Do that. 47:11 [SPEAKER_01]: I mean, all you need is to hit six refineries. 47:16 [SPEAKER_01]: There are six refineries in Southeast Asia, India and China that process the vast majority of that Russian crude and they need to be special because the nature of your role's crude is very sulfurous. 47:29 [SPEAKER_01]: It's a heavy crude and you can't just refine it anywhere so you can hit them. 47:33 [SPEAKER_01]: I want to push back and I've given enough flattery that I can now disagree and say there was something to your opinion about your answer mark that really raised my shackles because I've lived about half my life on this continent and it has it can't do attitude. 47:49 [SPEAKER_01]: There is something genuinely different about the way Americans look at problems and the way Europeans look at problems and [SPEAKER_01]: I don't like that can't do. 47:59 [SPEAKER_01]: Oh, there's this problem with that and the URL clear if we see it then he'll see some, you know, Western assets and Russia. 48:04 [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, that's true. 48:05 [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, there's this reason. 48:07 [SPEAKER_01]: But 48:08 [SPEAKER_01]: those reasons articulated in that way lead to a lack of political resolve and Europeans have historically, not historically, you know, up until 1945, but historically in the last 30 years lacked the political resolve to take really bold initiatives, and that's the reason that they don't have air defense. 48:26 [SPEAKER_01]: They could have had air defense if they thought, you know what, if we make a pool of capital and we do this on this and this and this. 48:32 [SPEAKER_01]: we can be competing with the Americans to make cutting-edge elephants, but they did it. 48:38 [SPEAKER_01]: So I just really want to push back against this defeatism. 48:43 [SPEAKER_01]: I think that there are plenty of steps even without involving America. 48:48 [SPEAKER_01]: God forbid Jade events once the next election. 48:50 [SPEAKER_01]: God forbid. 48:51 [SPEAKER_01]: that still there are things that can be done, not only the seizing of assets, but Europe has traditionally not had the level of sophistication of OFAC. 49:02 [SPEAKER_01]: OFAC is the part of the U.S. government the office for our NASA controls, which we're working together with Treasury and the Fed, D-Risks and Sanktians. 49:11 [SPEAKER_01]: And traditionally, OFAC is more financially capable of AML and counterterrorism financing than European equivalents. 49:19 [SPEAKER_01]: Europeans are not as good as those things, but they could be. 49:23 [SPEAKER_01]: There's a million reasons why they haven't developed that capacity. 49:26 [SPEAKER_01]: And I want to say, if Burnham just said, you know what? 49:30 [SPEAKER_01]: I want to have the British version of O-FAC be at the level of O-FAC rather than always three days later, just copy and pasting American sanctions. 49:40 [SPEAKER_01]: They could. 49:41 [SPEAKER_01]: They just don't. 49:44 [SPEAKER_00]: True. 49:44 [SPEAKER_00]: And again, in part, that's because as soon as you close the city of London, the suspicion is that the Frankfurt Paris or much more of the case do buy, step in for that. 49:55 [SPEAKER_00]: Of course, the irony is that actually sanctions in many ways keeps money inside Russia, whereas actually, I mean, ironically, we might want to be encouraging money laundering. 50:04 [SPEAKER_00]: we want to siphon as much run money out of Russia. 50:07 [SPEAKER_00]: Turn the kleptocrats, kleptocracy into our friend. 50:10 [SPEAKER_00]: But there's this major point about about sort of political decisiveness and so forth. 50:15 [SPEAKER_00]: And absolutely, Europe is not like that, but point is Europe needs to maintain its unity. 50:20 [SPEAKER_00]: It's fine to say, oh, we could do much more dramatic things. 50:24 [SPEAKER_00]: The thing is that actually the point at which European unity begins to fragment is the point at which Putin wins. 50:31 [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, I would much rather managing to maintain near enough consensus, and we sort of had the blips like, you know, Hungary or Poland's resistance to supporting Ukrainian agriculture and such like, and yes, they are problematic. 50:47 [SPEAKER_00]: But the point is that we are not in this for the short term. 50:51 [SPEAKER_01]: We have to accept that we need to maintain unity for at least another year and I'm sorry I couldn't disagree more and I'm so glad that we're having this direct confrontation because I think that it clarifies our positions. 51:05 [SPEAKER_01]: in 2014, David Cameron could have simply seized oligarched linked assets in the UK. 51:13 [SPEAKER_01]: Boom, just do it. 51:15 [SPEAKER_01]: And the reason they didn't is, oh, the Germans are still dependent on Russian gas and they don't want this and oh, we'd have to work with whoever. 51:22 [SPEAKER_01]: Screw it! 51:23 [SPEAKER_01]: The point is, they didn't reach for those levers and they didn't bluff Putin. 51:29 [SPEAKER_01]: Biden, in the lead-up to the special military operation, had intelligence that other than the brits, the rest of the Europeans really didn't believe in. 51:40 [SPEAKER_01]: All of Shaltz was like, oh, they're not going to, we don't need to do whatever. 51:45 [SPEAKER_01]: I believe that we have the technical capacity in the CIA and other American agencies to make the lights go off in St. Petersburg for a brief period of time to do offensive hacking on Russian computer systems. 52:00 [SPEAKER_01]: And if those had been done in January 2022, [SPEAKER_01]: Even if there wasn't pan-western unity for that, people might have thought twice. 52:08 [SPEAKER_01]: And we could have then said, you know what, if you do this again, the lights are going to go off and say, Peter is burnt for three days. 52:14 [SPEAKER_01]: And it might have been that we didn't have the capacity to do that. 52:16 [SPEAKER_01]: But Putin has bluffed us, whether it was in 2008 in Georgia or the Syria red line. 52:21 [SPEAKER_01]: We could bluff him back. 52:23 [SPEAKER_01]: So there's always going to be some micro reasons of like, oh, what we don't have. 52:28 [SPEAKER_01]: the full unity, will you're never going to be able to have a surprise action or a bluff action, whether it's seizing assets or offensive cyber, if you need the unity you're talking about? 52:39 [SPEAKER_00]: Now that's perfectly true what you're saying about what could have been done before February 2022 and again that that was a sort of a... 52:46 [SPEAKER_00]: a terrible situation in which for a variety of reasons we didn't really manage to convey genuine, serious risks. 52:54 [SPEAKER_00]: I mean, unfortunately, we relied on strategic ambiguity, which is more as saying, oh, but not do this Putin or, oh, yeah, they'll be bad things. 53:00 [SPEAKER_00]: We won't tell you what they are, but they'll be really bad and no wonder, given that we have failed to react after 2014 after the invasion of Georgia and such like that he didn't believe that that was the case. 53:11 [SPEAKER_00]: And yes, but we are in a different world now, and you know the most dangerous thing for Ukraine would be if Europe was no longer willing or able to provide the funds that essentially keep Ukraine going. 53:22 [SPEAKER_00]: Of course. 53:22 [SPEAKER_00]: Of course. 53:23 [SPEAKER_00]: And therefore, for that, that is why unity matters. 53:27 [SPEAKER_00]: That is why unity is important. 53:29 [SPEAKER_00]: And the second point is this. 53:31 [SPEAKER_00]: Now, Putin is absolutely stuck in a corner. 53:34 [SPEAKER_00]: You know, he has some of his own memoirs. 53:36 [SPEAKER_00]: Well, Ghost Written Memoirs. 53:38 [SPEAKER_00]: This tale of when, as a kid, they were chasing rats. 53:42 [SPEAKER_01]: Yeah, they were in this before somethings. 53:43 [SPEAKER_00]: And, you know, [SPEAKER_00]: the rat in the corner that jumped. 53:47 [SPEAKER_00]: Yeah, that's where that is, I think, where Putin is. 53:50 [SPEAKER_00]: Okay, we have to consider that the risks there and the fact that he can still escalate against Ukraine and against us. 53:57 [SPEAKER_01]: So let's get to actual solutions because I feel like listeners frequently write in and they're like, great, you know? 54:04 [SPEAKER_01]: I got to the solutions bit of the podcast where you supposedly ordered the disorder and then you tell us all these reasons why the disorder can't be ordered. 54:11 [SPEAKER_01]: So what I want to ask you is [SPEAKER_01]: If Russia has become one of the world's most effective global disorders, what are two as three things that Western governments can actually do? 54:21 [SPEAKER_01]: Not good have done in the past, not that they need too much unity, not that are politically unpalatable. 54:27 [SPEAKER_01]: What are things that can actually be done to help constrain the disorder that Russia emits into the global system, even if those aren't things that will magically make Ukraine win? 54:39 [SPEAKER_00]: First of all, I think it is crucial that we appreciate the degree to which the Russians use our own weaknesses against us. 54:46 [SPEAKER_00]: And I think we have abandoned our effective efforts to try and sell the global order. 54:52 [SPEAKER_00]: in large parts of the world. 54:54 [SPEAKER_00]: So that's the first thing. 54:56 [SPEAKER_00]: In a way, we need to understand that this actually should mean something. 55:00 [SPEAKER_00]: On a more sort of micro scale one, again, I think the issue is precisely at present that the global order is seen as a sort of take what you want buffet. 55:10 [SPEAKER_00]: If we look, I mentioned Dubai, for example, if we look at the money flows that continue to allow the Russians to 55:18 [SPEAKER_00]: arranged to buy all kinds of sanctioned goodies, for example, whether we're talking about designer handbags, roligarks, mistresses, or whether we're talking about microchips for missiles. 55:29 [SPEAKER_00]: So much of it depends on their continued capacity to operate within the global financial system. 55:34 [SPEAKER_00]: And although at first, we worried that it would be countries like China, who would act as their sort of laundering points. 55:41 [SPEAKER_00]: It's not. 55:42 [SPEAKER_00]: It's actually countries that are mainstream within the global financial system. 55:46 [SPEAKER_00]: That's where if we really want to try and put our finger on the hose pipe of money going in and out of Russia, supporting all kinds of operations from destabilizing activities in Africa all the way through to sanctions busting. 56:03 [SPEAKER_00]: We need to look at these international financial flows because basically money fuels everything. 56:09 [SPEAKER_00]: The third point is in terms of I think there's a lot of talk about counter narratives, propaganda and such like to try not undermine Putinism and so forth, not an easy topic but I think one that we could be doing a lot more about. 56:24 [SPEAKER_00]: What I think we are failing to do is essentially to challenge Putin's narrative that the problem is that the West hates us, that the global order is there 56:36 [SPEAKER_00]: And instead, we need to be giving a positive spin, which is precisely, look, you know the Russia that you'd like, the Russia in which you're going to be safe and prosperous and your kids are going to have a better life than you and so forth. 56:49 [SPEAKER_00]: Well, actually, you get that by being an insider, not an outsider. 56:53 [SPEAKER_00]: We love Russians, we just hate what the Kremlin is doing in the world. 56:57 [SPEAKER_00]: You know, I think there is a lot more we could be doing in terms of active information operations that are not just simply about sort of maligned disinformation, but are actually about telling people real story about the fact of, you know, what could be there if they were part of the wider global order? 57:14 [SPEAKER_01]: From your math to God's ears, I love the way you put that. 57:17 [SPEAKER_01]: So, last question, if you could create one global institution to constrain the non-military threat of Russia and similar states, meaning not NATO, but one which would attempt to buttress the rules base order undermine non-military threats, what would this institution be and how would it function? 57:40 [SPEAKER_00]: Well, I mean, the glid first answer is it will be like the haig international war crimes tribunals, but for politicians who'd lighter their own people. 57:48 [SPEAKER_00]: However, that would have to be just so huge in the institution. 57:53 [SPEAKER_00]: Unfortunately, that I don't think we're going to be sort of seeing that soon. 57:57 [SPEAKER_00]: Now, I mean, if it is one institution, exactly, it needs to be about finance. 58:02 [SPEAKER_00]: It's boring, it's technical, it's tedious, it lacks sex appeal. 58:07 [SPEAKER_00]: It's not going to see people kicking down doors. 58:09 [SPEAKER_00]: It's going to involve sort of legal rits and banks being closed and audited, but nonetheless, taking something like the FATF, the financial action task force and expanding it into something that has much greater teeth and teeth that operates not on a national level, but on an institutional level. 58:27 [SPEAKER_00]: and more or less says if you want your country to be part of the global financial system, you have to sign up to the following terms and you have to accept that there is going to be a kind of a metaphorical financial interpol. 58:39 [SPEAKER_00]: That is going to come sometimes, come into your country and say this bank needs to be closed and then you have to do it. 58:47 [SPEAKER_01]: I love it. 58:49 [SPEAKER_01]: It's been a real pleasure 58:54 [SPEAKER_01]: you become a mega-order of those of you who are not so that you can hear Mark and I discussing can Ukraine actually win and a listener question and some more jokes about Russian spares. 59:15 [SPEAKER_01]: Well that's more than enough for me. 59:18 [SPEAKER_01]: Wow, it has been exciting chatting with learning from and disagreeing with Mark Galliotti. 59:26 [SPEAKER_01]: I think you'd really enjoy his books, you'd really enjoy his podcast, and you'd super enjoy the appearance in the Mega Order as club which you should join. 59:36 [SPEAKER_01]: Please join the Mega Order as club for the bonus content and the early release episodes and 59:44 [SPEAKER_01]: This episode has been produced by the one the only the George McDonald, he knows how to order the disorder, he could outlast Putin, he could even help Ukraine win none of these wish he watched the answers from George McDonald. 60:01 [SPEAKER_01]: Check out the links in the show notes from more of Mark's content, check out our ordering the disorder sub-stack where I'm going to have lots of takeaways from this conversation. 60:11 [SPEAKER_01]: And that's where you can get written forms of the podcast, written forms of the main arguments and then bonus content for the pay for sub-stack. 60:20 [SPEAKER_01]: We need you to contribute peoples because we lose money every month to produce this. 60:25 [SPEAKER_01]: We are still powered by Red Circle and we are hoping to bring you better and better content all the time. 60:33 [SPEAKER_01]: So thank you for listening and I wish you Putin-Free Merry Orderness.
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