Summa Contra Gentiles, Second Book (On Creation)

by Saint Thomas Aquinas

Christianity - Commentary Christianity - Other

101 chapters13h 30mEnglish1923

About this book

The Summa Contra Gentiles was composed by Thomas Aquinas between 1259 and 1265, in four books broadly covering teachings on God, on Creation, on Providence, and on tenets specific to Christianity. This Summa is not to be confused with his final Summa, the Summa Theologiae. The latter is specifically "theological" and directed to a Christian audience (hence Summa "Theologica"), whereas the former, as the "Contra Gentiles" indicates, is directed toward "non-Christian" thinkers. Implicitly a defence of the Catholic Christian faith, the first three books constitute a sort of rational apology of Christian thought, where philosophical arguments are deployed to defend Christian beliefs and usually only evoke Scripture in a latter instance to show its concordance with these largely-rational conclusions; the fourth book, however, is theological in character given that its content deals primarily with topics derived from Christian revelation. Although Thomas Aquinas certainly aims to discredit pagan, Jewish, Muslim or Christian-"heretical" positions incompatible with the Catholic Christian religion in this work, at the same time he incorporates whatever is salvageable from their thought, thus often quoting in his favor the very authors he discredits on other positions: therefore the "Contra Gentiles" of this Summa is not to be understood as an outright rejection of non-Christian thought, but rather as a sort of "rational purification" unto its Catholic assimilation, in disposing open minds to revealed Christian truths. (Summary by M.S.C. Lambert, LC)

Chapters (101)

1I. CONNECTION OF THE FOREGOING WITH THE SEQUEL

243

2II. THAT THE CONSIDERATION OF CREATURES IS USEFUL FOR BUILDING UP OUR FAITH

314

3III. THAT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF CREATURES AVAILS FOR REFUTING ERRORS AGAINST GOD

308

4IV. THAT THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE THEOLOGIAN TREAT OF CREATURES IN DIFFERENT WAYS

247

5V. ORDER OF THE THINGS TO BE SAID

6VI. THAT IT BECOMES GOD TO BE THE SOURCE OF BEING TO OTHER THINGS

262

7VII. THAT IN GOD THERE IS ACTIVE POWER

160

8VIII. THAT GOD'S POWER IS HIS SUBSTANCE

165

9IX. THAT GOD'S POWER IS HIS ACTION

139

10X. IN WHAT WAY POWER IS ASCRIBED TO GOD

146

11XI. THAT SOMETHING IS SAID OF GOD IN RELATION TO CREATURES

148

12XII. THAT RELATIONS SAID OF GOD IN REFERENCE TO CREATURES ARE NOT REALLY IN GOD

230

13XIII. HOW THE AFORESAID RELATIONS ARE PREDICATED OF GOD

186

14XIV. HOW THE AFORESAID RELATIONS ARE PREDICATED OF GOD

15XV. THAT GOD IS TO ALL THINGS THE CAUSE OF BEING

514

16XVI. THAT GOD BROUGHT THINGS INTO BEING OUT OF NOTHING

697

17XVII. THAT CREATION IS NEITHER MOVEMENT NOR CHANGE

208

18XVIII. HOW TO SOLVE THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST CREATION

167

19XIX. THAT IN CREATION THERE IS NO SUCCESSION

350

20XX. THAT NO BODY CAN CREATE

322

21XXI. THAT IT BELONGS TO GOD ALONE TO CREATE

651

22XXII. THAT GOD CAN DO ALL THINGS

482

23XXIII. THAT GOD DOES NOT ACT OF NATURAL NECESSITY

515

24XXIV. THAT GOD WORKS ACCORDING TO HIS WISDOM

273

25XXV. HOW THE ALMIGHTY IS SAID TO BE UNABLE TO DO CERTAIN THINGS

598

26XXVI. THAT THE DIVINE INTELLECT IS NOT CONFINED TO CERTAIN DETERMINED EFFECTS

314

27XXVII. THAT THE DIVINE WILL IS NOT CONFINED TO CERTAIN EFFECTS

28XXVIII. HOW THERE IS ANYTHING DUE IN THE PRODUCTION OF THINGS

508

29XXIX. HOW THERE IS ANYTHING DUE IN THE PRODUCTION OF THINGS

386

30XXX. HOW THERE CAN BE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY IN CREATED THINGS

1016

31XXXI. THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR CREATURES TO HAVE BEEN ALWAYS

369

32XXXII. ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WISH TO PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM GOD'S SIDE OF THE QUESTION

596

33XXXIII. ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CREATURES

459

34XXXIV. ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE MAKING

322

35XXXV. SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS, AND FIRST OF THOSE THAT WERE TAKEN FROM THE STANDPOINT OF GOD

652

36XXXVI. SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS PRODUCED ON THE PART OF THE THINGS MADE

368

37XXXVII. SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS TAKEN FROM THE MAKING OF THINGS

420

38XXXVIII. ARGUMENTS BY WHICH SOME ENDEAVOUR TO PROVE THAT THE WORLD IS NOT ETERNAL

459

39XXXIX. THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT FROM CHANCE

419

40XL. THAT MATTER IS NOT THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS

325

41XLI. THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT ON ACCOUNT OF A CONTRARIETY OF AGENTS

649

42XLII. THAT THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT THE ORDER OF SECONDARY AGENTS

526

43XLIII. THAT THE DISTINCTION AMONG THINGS DOES NOT RESULT FROM SOME SECONDARY AGENT INTRODUCING VARIOUS FORMS INTO MATTER

443

44XLIV. THAT DISTINCTION AMONG THINGS DID NOT RESULT FROM THE DIVERSITY OF MERITS OR DEMERITS

812

45XLV. WHAT IS IN TRUTH THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS

446

46XLVI. THAT FOR THE PERFECTION OF THE UNIVERSE IT WAS NECESSARY THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME INTELLECTUAL CREATURES

447

47XLVII. THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE CAPABLE OF WILLING

384

48XLVIII. THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE OF FREE-WILL IN ACTING

368

49XLIX. THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS NOT A BODY

406

50L. THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE IMMATERIAL

381

51LI. THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS NOT A MATERIAL FORM

170

52LII. THAT IN CREATED INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEING AND WHAT IS

481

53LIII. THAT IN CREATED INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES THERE IS ACT AND POTENTIALITY

208

54LIV. THAT COMPOSITION OF SUBSTANCE AND BEING IS NOT THE SAME AS COMPOSITION OF MATTER AND FORM

293

55LV. THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE INCORRUPTIBLE

1008

56LVI. IN WHAT WAY IT IS POSSIBLE FOR AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE TO BE UNITED TO THE BODY

652

57LVII. THE OPINION OF PLATO CONCERNING THE UNION OF THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL WITH THE BODY

676

58LVIII. THAT THE NUTRITIVE, SENSITIVE, AND INTELLECTIVE FACULTIES IN MAN ARE NOT THREE SOULS

731

59LIX. THAT MAN'S POSSIBLE INTELLECT IS NOT A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE

745

60LX. THAT MAN DERIVES HIS SPECIES NOT FROM THE PASSIVE, BUT FROM THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT

1364

61LXI. THAT THE AFORESAID OPINION IS CONTRARY TO THAT OF ARISTOTLE

264

62LXII. AGAINST THE OPINION OF ALEXANDER ABOUT THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT

590

63LXIII. THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A TEMPERAMENT, AS GALEN ASSERTED

215

64LXIV. THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A HARMONY

169

65LXV. THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A BODY

276

66LXVI. AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY THAT INTELLECT AND SENSE ARE THE SAME

190

67LXVII. AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT IS THE IMAGINATION

161

68LXVIII. HOW AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE CAN BE THE FORM OF THE BODY

527

69LXIX. SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS BY WHICH IT WAS PROVED ABOVE THAT AN INTELLECTUAL SLBSTANCE CANNOT BE UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM

394

70LXX. THAT ACCORDING TO THE WORDS OF ARISTOTLE WE JUST SAY THAT THE INTELLECT IS UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM

320

71LXXI. THAT THE SOUL IS UNITED TO THE BODY IMMEDIATELY

157

72LXXII. THAT THE WHOLE SOUL IS IN THE WHOLE BODY AND IN EACH PART THEREOF

340

73LXXIII. THAT THERE IS NOT ONE POSSIBLE INTELLECT IN ALL MEN

1820

74LXXIV. OF THE OPINION OF AVICENNA, WHO ASSERTED THAT INTELLIGIBLE FORMS ARE NOT PRESERVED IN THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT

716

75LXXV. SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS WHICH WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THE UNITY OF THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT

1129

76LXXVI. THAT THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IS NOT A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE BUT PART OF THE SOUL

1038

77LXXVII. THAT IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE POSSIBLE AND ACTIVE INTELLECT TO CONCUR IN THE ONE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUL

474

78LXXVIII. THAT ARISTOTLE'S OPINION CONCERNING THE ACTIVE INTELLECT WAS NOT THAT IT IS A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE, BUT RATHER THAT IT IS PART OF THE SOUL

841

79LXXIX. THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS NOT CORRUPTED WHEN THE BODY IS CORRUPTED

714

80LXXX. ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THAT THE SOUL IS CORRUPTED WHEN THE BODY IS CORRUPTED

409

81LXXXI. ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THAT THE SOUL IS CORRUPTED WHEN THE BODY IS CORRUPTED

791

82LXXXII. THAT THE SOULS OF DUMB ANIMALS ARE NOT IMMORTAL

876

83LXXXIII. THAT THE HUMAN SOUL BEGINS TO EXIST WITH THE BODY

1887

84LXXXIV. SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS

366

85LXXXV. THAT THE SOUL IS NOT MADE OF GOD'S SUBSTANCE

444

86LXXXVI. THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS NOT TRANSMITTED WITH THE SEMEN

471

87LXXXVII. THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS BROUGHT INTO BEING THROUGH CREATION BY GOD

350

88LXXXVIII. ARGUMENTS FOR PROVING THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS FORMED FROM THE SEMEN

557

89LXXXIX. SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS

1424

90XC. THAT AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS UNITED AS A FORM TO NO OTHER THAN THE HUMAN BODY

652

91XCI. THAT THERE ARE SOME INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES WHICH ARE NOT UNITED TO BODIES

602

92XCII. OF THE GREAT NUMBER OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES

702

93XCIII. THAT THERE ARE NOT SEVERAL SEPARATE SUBSTANCES OF ONE SPECIES

226

94XCIV. THAT THE SEPARATE SUBSTANCE AND THE SOUL ARE NOT OF ONE SPECIES

182

95XCV. HOW WE ARE TO UNDERSTAND GENUS AND SPECIES IN SEPARATE SUBSTANCES

379

96XCVI. THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES DO NOT GATHER THEIR KNOWLEDGE FROM SENSIBLES

517

97XCVII. THAT THE INTELLECT OF A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE ALWAYS UNDERSTANDS ACTUALLY

175

98XCVIII. HOW ONE SEPARATE SUBSTANCE UNDERSTANDS ANOTHER

1119

99XCIX. THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES KNOW MATERIAL THINGS

269

100C. THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES KNOW SINGULARS

328

101CI. WHETHER SEPARATE SUBSTANCES KNOW ALL THINGS AT THE SAME TIME BY THEIR NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

204

Summa Contra Gentiles, Second Book (On Creation)

About this book

Chapters (101)

Comments