Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
von Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Über dieses Buch
Here is the final report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission into the causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Two thorough Dissenting Statements accompany the final report. The report is a chronological compendium of the review of millions of pages of documents, the interviews of hundreds of leaders, CxOs, financial experts and academics, as well as common people, home- and business-owners who were also significantly affected by the financial meltdown. - Summary by Mario Pineda
Kapitel (182)
1Conclusions of the Commission
2Conclusions of the Commission, concluded
3Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 1
4Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 2
5Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 3
6Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: Commercial Paper and Repos
7Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: The Savings and Loan Crisis
8Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
9Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Structured Finance
10Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: The Growth of Derivatives
11Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Expansion of Banking Activities
12Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Long-Term Capital Management
13Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Dot-Com Crash
14Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: The Wages of Finance
15Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Financial Sector Growth
16Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Mortgage Securitization
17Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Greater Access to Lending
18Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Subprime Lenders in Turmoil
19Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: The Regulators
20Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Housing, A Powerful Stabilizing Force
21Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Subprime Loans, Buyers Will Pay A Premium
22Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Citigroup: Invited Regulatory Scrutiny
23Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Federal Rules: Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive Lending
24Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. States: Long-Standing Position
25Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Community-Lending Pledges: What We Do Is Reaffirm Our Intention"
26Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Bank Capital Standards: "Arbitrage"
27Ch. 6. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 6
28Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. An Irresistible Profit Opportunity
29Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Mortgages: A Good Loan
30Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Federal Regulators: Immunity from Many State Laws is a Significant Benefit
31Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our Product
32Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Moody's: Given A Blank Check
33Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Less Competition in the Marketplace
34Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 7
35Ch. 8. The CDO Machine
36Ch. 8. We Created the Investor
37Ch. 8. Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds: It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just Didn't Function
38Ch. 8. Citigroup's Liquidity puts: A Potential Conflict of Interest
39Ch. 8. AIG:Golden Goose for the Entire Street
40Ch. 8. Goldman Sachs: Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in Subprime
41Ch. 8. Moody's: Achieved Through Some Alchemy
42Ch. 8. SEC: It's Going to be an Awfully Big Mess
43Commission Conclusions on Chapter 8
44Chapter 9. The Bubble, "A Credit-induced Boom"
45Mortgage Fraud: Crime-facilitative environments
46Disclosure and due diligence: A Quality Control Issue in the Factory
47Regulators: markets will always self-correct
48Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate: You've Got to Get Up and Dance
49Lehman: From Moving to Storage
50Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Two Stark Choices
512006: Increase Our Penetration into Subprime. 2007: Moving deeper into the credit pool
52Affordable housing goals: "GSEs cried bloody murder forever." The impact of the goals
53Commission Conclusions on Chapter 9
54Ch. 10. CDO Managers: "We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager"
55Ch. 10. Credit Default Swaps: "Dumb Question"
56Citigroup: "I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless"
57AIG: "I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks"
58Merrill Lynch: "Whatever It Takes"
59Regulators: "Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing?"
60Moody's: "It Was All About Revenue"
61Commission Conclusions on Chapter 10
62Ch. 11. The Bust. Delinquencies: "The Turn of the Housing Market"
63Ch. 11. Rating Downgrades: "Never Before"
64Ch. 11. CDOs: "Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending"
65Ch. 11. Legal Remedies: "On the Basis of the Information"
66Ch. 11. Losses: "Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?"
67Commission Conclusions on Ch. 11
68Early 2007: Spreading Subprime Worries
69Ch. 12. Goldman: Let's be Aggressive
70Bear Stearns's Hedge Funds
71Rating Agencies
72AIG: Well Bigger
73Commission Conclusions on Ch. 12
74Chapter 13 Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding Intro
75Ch 13 IKB of Germany "Real Money Investors"
76Ch 13 Countrywide: "That's our 9/11"
77Ch 13 BNP Paribas: "The ringing of the bells"
78Ch 13 SIVs: "An Oasis of Calm"
79Ch 13 Money funds and other investors: "Drink[ing] from a fire hose"
80Commission conclusions on Chapter 13
81Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008: Billions in subprime losses (Intro)
82Ch 14 Merrill Lynch: "Dawining awareness over the course of the summer"
83Ch 14 Citigroup: "That would not in any way have excited my attention"
84Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman: "There could never be losses"
85Ch 14 Federal Reserve: "The discount window wasn't working"
86Ch 14 Monoline Insurers: "We never expected losses"
87Commission Conclusions on Chapter 14
88Chapter 15 March 2008: The fall of Bear Stearns (Intro)
89Ch 15 "I requested some forbearance"
90Ch 15 "We were suitably skeptical"
91Ch 15 "Turn into a death spiral"
92Ch 15 "Duty to protect their investors"
93Ch 15 "The Government would not permit a higher number"
94Ch 15 "It was heading to a black hole"
95Commission Conclusions on Chapter 15
96Chapter 16 March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns (Intro)
97Ch 16 The Federal Reserve: "When people got scared"
98Ch 16 JP Morgan: "Refusing to unwind...would be unforgiveable"
99Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC: "Weak liquidity position"
100Ch 16 Derivatives: "Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk"
101Ch 16 Banks: "The markets were really, really dicey"
102Commission Conclusions on Chapter 16
103Chapter 17 September 2008: The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Intro)
104Ch 17 "A good time to buy"
105Ch 17 "The only game in town"
106Ch 17 "It's a time game...be cool"
107Ch 17 "The idea strikes me as perverse"
108Ch 17 "It will increase confidence"
109Ch 17 "Critical unsafe and unsound practices"
110Ch 17 "They went from zero to three with no warning in between"
111Ch 17 "The worst-run financial institution"
112Ch 17 "Wasn't done at my pay grade"
113Commission Conclusions on Chapter 17
114Chapter 18 September 2008: The bankruptcy of Lehman (Intro)
115Ch 18 "Get more conservatively funded"
116Ch 18 "This is not sounding good at all"
117Ch 18 "Spook the market"
118Ch 18 "Imagination hat"
119Ch 18 "Heads of family"
120Ch 18 "Tell those sons of bitches to unwind"
121Ch 18 "This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty"
122Ch 18 "The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail"
123Ch 18 "A calamity"
124Commission Conclusions on Chapter 18
125Chapter 19 September 2008: The bailout of AIG (Intro)
126Ch 19 "Current liquidity position is precarious"
127Ch 19 "Spillover effect"
128Ch 19 "Like a gnat on an elephant"
129Commission Conclusions on Chapter 19
130Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic (Intro)
131Ch 20 Money market funds: "Dealers weren't even picking up their phones"
132Ch 20 Morgan Stanley: "Now we're the next in line"
133Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives "A grinding halt"
134Ch 20 Washington Mutual "It's yours"
135Ch 20 Wachovia "At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell"
136Ch 20 TARP "Comprehensive approach"
137Ch 20 AIG "We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient"
138Ch 20 Citigroup "Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman"
139Ch 20 Bank of America "A shotgun wedding"
140Commission Conclusions on Chapter 20
141Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout (Intro)
142Ch 21 Households "I'm not eating, I'm not sleeping"
143Ch 21 Businesses "Squirrels storing nuts"
144Ch 21 Commercial real estate: "Nothing's moving"
145Ch 21 Government: "State struggled to close shortfalls"
146Ch 21 The financial sector: "Almost triple the level of three years earlier"
147Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise: "Hard to talk about any recovery"
148Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures "Persistently disregard"
149Ch 22 Flaws in the process: "Speculation and worst-case scenarios"
150Ch 22 Neighborhood effects: "I'm not leaving"
151Commission Conclusions on Chapter 22
152Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Intro
153Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our approach differs from others?
154Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of the crisis
155Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten essential causes of the financial and economic crisis
156Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit bubble: global capita flows, underpriced risk, and Federal Reserve policy
157Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housing bubble
158Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning bad mortgages into toxic financial assets
159Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank bets and why banks failed
160Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types of systemic failure
161Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock and panic
162Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system freezing
163Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Intro
164Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - Summary
165Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1. Government policies resulted in an unprecedented number of risky mortgages
166Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2. The great housing bubble and its effects
167Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3. Delinquency rates on nontraditional mortgages
168Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4. The origin and growth of subprime PMBS
169Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5. What was known about NTMs prior to the crisis?
170Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6. Conclusion
171Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - Intro
172Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - How failures among NTMs were transmitted to the financial system
173Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - The defaults begin
174Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - Intro
175Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 1. HUD's central role
176Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 2. The decline of mortgage underwriting standards
177Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 1
178Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSEs' acquired so many NTMs, part 2
179Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 4. Competition between the GSEs and FHA for subprime and alt-a mortgages
180Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 5. Enlisting mortgage bankers and subprime lenders in affordable housing
181Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 6. The community reinvestment act
182Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV. Conclusion
Kommentare